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UNITED STATES v. BALSYS: FOREIGN
PROSECUTION AND THE APPLICABILITY OF
THE FIFIH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
INTRODUCTION
While more than fifty years has lapsed since the end of World War
II and the downfall of Hitler's Nazi regime, the memories of that hor-
rific period in history and of those people who collaborated in the
goals of the Nazis remain alive for many. Many nations worldwide
still have means available for punishing these criminals. Other nations
have served as refuges for them, even if unknowingly. The United
States is one country that became a home to many Nazi war criminals
who wanted to escape punishment and begin a new life.
The United States has not enacted any criminal laws that specifi-
cally punish suspected war criminals. The United States, however,
does have a policy of investigating and deporting them through the
Department of Justice Office of Special Investigations ("OSI").1 Un-
til the 1998 Supreme Court decision of United States v. Balsys,2 courts
were divided as to whether these suspects have the constitutional right
to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in
a domestic proceeding based upon a fear of a real and substantial like-
lihood of foreign prosecution. Until the Supreme Court held that the
privilege does not extend extraterritorially, lower courts had very little
guidance and were left to grapple with the scope of the privilege
themselves, resulting in divergent approaches to this issue.3 In the
1. The Office of Special Investigations, established in 1979 by the Attorney General, is
charged with the civil enforcement of United Sates immigration and citizenship laws against
alleged participation in Nazi-sponsored persecution. See 8 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 220, 222,
n.4 (1984); Att'y Gen. Order No. 851-79 (1979), 28 C.F.R. § 0.55(f) (1979). In other words, the
OSI, as an arm of the Department of Justice, seeks out those who participated in crimes against
humanity during World War It in order to deport them. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D) (West
1996) (describing that aliens who have engaged in assisting in Nazi persecutions are deportable).
Since the United States Constitution prohibits ex post facto laws, Nazi war collaborators cannot
be criminally prosecuted for their actions during World War II. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. The
United States does have available the civil remedies of deportation and, if applicable, denaturali-
zation. See Att'y Gen. Order No. 851-79.
2. 118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419 (11th Cir. 1997). The majority held that the
privilege against self-incrimination did not extend to witnesses who feared foreign prosecution
while a large minority of dissenters concluded that the privilege should extend. Id; see United
States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the privilege does extend to witnesses
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summer of 1997, two appellate courts created a circuit split in cases
with virtually parallel facts, which persuaded the Supreme Court to
decide the issue.4 In the Eleventh Circuit case of United States v. Ge-
cas,5 the court found that the defendant could not rely on the Fifth
Amendment to withhold information from the OSI.6 Conversely, the
Second Circuit in United States v. Balsys7 extended the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege to the defendant. 8
This constitutional claim has been raised by witnesses in a variety of
circumstances in which they feared prosecution in another country for
incriminating testimony required in a United States proceeding. 9 The
lower courts have all struggled over various issues surrounding this
constitutional question, including the degree of protection that immu-
nity affords and whether the witness faces a "real and substantial fear"
of prosecution under another sovereign's jurisdiction.' 0 The Supreme
Court, which refused to extend constitutional protection to witnesses
fearing foreign prosecution, has provided a clear rule for courts to
follow.
Part I of this Note will focus on the development of the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination by examining the
development of the jurisprudence of self-incrimination which resulted
in two opposite modes of analysis: one focusing on a limited "same
jurisdiction rule" and the other focusing on a broader application of
the privilege.'" It first will trace this development based on both Eng-
lish and American common law and will describe two Supreme Court
decisions, each applying one of the two modes of analysis. Part I will
also discuss the intended purposes and underlying policies of this priv-
ilege. Finally, Part I will address the history of the applicability of the
who fear foreign prosecution); United States v. (Under Seal), 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1986) [here-
inafter Araneta] (holding that the privilege should not extend); Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp.
857, 882 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (extending privilege).
4. See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2222 n.2.
5. 120 F.3d 1419.
6. Id. at 1422.
7. 119 F.3d 122.
8. Id. at 124.
9. United States v. Yanagita, 552 F.2d 940, 941 (2d Cir. 1977) (fearing testimony would subject
witness to prosecution in Japan for conspiracy to assassinate the emperor); In re Tierney, 465
F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972) (refusing to testify in grand jury proceeding, despite grant of immunity,
based on fear of prosecution in Great Britain); In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067, 1069 (10th Cir. 1969)
(refusing to testify based on fear that such testimony would serve as a link in the chain of evi-
dence required to prosecute her for an extraditable Canadian crime).
10. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478-81 (1972)
(applying the test for determining when a court must consider the applicability of the Fifth
Amendment's self-incrimination clause without deciding the issue).
11. See infra Part I.
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United States Constitution to resident aliens. Part II will detail the
Supreme Court decision and rationale of United States v. Balsys,'
2
which ultimately concluded that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion does not extend beyond the borders of the United States. 13 Part
III analyzes the Balsys decision.14 Specifically, it criticizes the Court's
rationale for reasserting the "same jurisdiction rule," which the
Supreme Court originally adopted in 1931,15 but later overturned in
1964.16 Part III next posits that the Court's treatment of the policies
behind the Fifth Amendment is too simplistic an approach, offering
instead that a broader reading of the Fifth Amendment is proper and
that the privilege against self-incrimination ought to be extended to
witnesses who fear foreign prosecution. Part III finally questions the
Supreme Court's motivations in arriving at its conclusion, suggesting
that the fact that the witness claiming the privilege was an alleged
Nazi war criminal influenced its decision. Part IV describes the im-
pact this decision will have on defendants who assert the privilege for
fear of foreign prosecution, on the United States government and its
law enforcement efforts, and on the courts that must now apply the
new rule. 17
I. BACKGROUND
The Fifth Amendment's clause against self-incrimination provides
that: "[N]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."1 8 This clause has its roots in British common
law, from which the framers of the United States Constitution
adopted a general principal against self-incrimination. 19 The framers
left us with little insight, however, as to what constituted the purposes
and rationales of this privilege.20 Largely, scholars must glean the
framers' intent from the privilege's history, early applications, and
sparse writings by the framers.21 This Part provides an overview of
the English and American foundations on which the right is based by
12. 118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 149 (1931).
16. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 77-78 (1964).
17. See infra Part IV.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 2.
19. See Eben Moglen, The Privilege in British North America: The Colonial Period to the Fifth
Amendment, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 109, 111-12, 133-34 (1997).
20. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 258 (1988).
21. See, e.g., ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955); LEONARD W.
LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968); John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047 (1994).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:987
discussing its history as interpreted by two twentieth century Supreme
Court decisions which serve as the basis for examining the scope of
the privilege. This Part also details the main purposes and rationales
of the privilege as widely agreed upon among scholars. Finally, this
Part focuses on how the Fifth Amendment applies to resident aliens
by examining case law, using the Supreme Court's test for determining
whether invoking the privilege is justified.22
A. History of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination
1. Early English Common Law and Its Translation into the
American Constitution
Arguably, the privilege against self-incrimination extendsback to
the Medieval period, when the ius commune, a combination of Roman
and canon law, governed the secular-as opposed to ecclesiastical-
jurisprudence of the day.2 3 The ius commune was the immediate
source of the Latin maxim, commonly invoked in the sixteenth cen-
tury, nemo tenetur prodere seipsum, or "no one should be required to
accuse himself."'2 4 Also active at this time were the ecclesiastical
courts, which had wide-ranging jurisdiction2 5 but did not subscribe to
the Latin maxim.2 6 Instead, these courts forced suspects to submit to
an ex officio oath, whereby they had to swear to answer truthfully all
22. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
23. R.H. Helmholz, The Privilege and the lus Commune.: The Middle Ages to the Seventeenth
Century, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, supra note 19, at 17; see GRISWOLD,
supra note 21, at 2 (describing the privilege as extending back to the twelfth century during
controversies between the king and bishops when the king sought to limit the jurisdiction of
bishops solely to ecclesiastical matters); LEVY, supra note 21, at 43-46 (noting differences be-
tween the secular and ecclesiastical courts that arose after the Norman conquest, during which
time, ecclesiastical courts were known to summon people to answer to "reckless or unsupported
charges"). But see id. at 433 (explaining that the Talmud of ancient Jewish law contains refer-
ences to this right). Any analysis pertaining to ancient Jewish law, however, is beyond the scope
of this note. See Langbein, supra note 21, at 1047-48 (asserting that the origins of the privilege
against self-incrimination actually are found later, at the end of the eighteenth century with the
rise of adversary criminal procedure and the grant to defendants of their own counsel, where
prior criminal procedure disallowed defense counsel, thereby forcing defendants to provided
their own defense).
24. Helmholz, supra note 23, at 17. Prior to this ideal, courts were based on secret interroga-
tions, which required a "self-incriminatory oath" as well as torture, both of which were used
solely to obtain a confession from the prisoner. LEVY, supra note 21, at 6.
25. Their jurisdiction included matters pertaining to the spiritual and to the clergy, including
sexual conduct, offenses against religion, sins of the flesh, and other types of immorality includ-
ing drunkenness and disorderly conduct. LEVY, supra note 21, at 44.
26. Helmholz, supra note 23, at 18.
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questions posed to them, often requiring at least some self-incriminat-
ing statements and not providing for a right of silence.27
Thus, there was a tension between the ius commune and the ecclesi-
astical courts. While still at its initial introduction in the sixteenth cen-
tury, the nemo tenetur prodere seipsum was simply an ideal that was
not immediately reflective of current practice, but was used as a basis
of challenge in the ecclesiastical courts.28 Eventually, this ideal be-
came so entrenched in the jurisprudence of the day that it ultimately
won out and became the common law of England.29
England's common law heavily influenced the framers of the
United States Constitution, who included a privilege against self-in-
crimination in the Fifth Amendment. Exactly how they intended this
privilege to take effect, however, is not entirely clear and has been a
subject of debate since the early days of this nation. Prior to the adop-
27. Id. It is interesting to note that the Star Chamber, which is commonly accepted as the
body in which the right against self-incrimination was born, originated procedures much like the
ecclesiastical courts. See LEVY, supra note 21, at 49-50. The Star Chamber was the embodiment
of the judicial body of the king's Council and consisted of clergy members as well as "doctors of
civil law" or professional lawyers. Id. This body acted under cloud of secrecy and required
witnesses to take the oath. Id. at 50-51. Typically, it did not inform the defendant of charges
against him. Id. at 51.
28. Helmholz, supra note 23, at 33; LEVY, supra note 21, at 70. But see Henry J. Friendly, The
Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968).
Judge Friendly, interpreting LEVY, supra note 21, noted that opposition to the oath may not have
been specifically in order to further the proposition that one had a right not to answer any
incriminating statements against oneself, thereby providing evidence for a conviction. Friendly,
supra, at 677. Rather, the opposition may have been motivated by the fact that one taking the
oath had not yet been specifically accused and thus was literally being made to provide the
accusation against himself. Id; see LEwis MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT?
13 (1959) (arguing that opposition to the ex officio oath was not directed against the interroga-
tion of a criminal witness, but against the interrogation of one who had not yet been charged).
29. GRISWOLD, supra note 21, at 3. The true meaning of this maxim, in terms of the modern
privilege against self-incrimination, has been the subject of some dispute, but Professor John H.
Langbein of Yale University posited in a 1994 law review article that only with the grant of
counsel to defendants in England in the eighteenth century did the defendant effectively have a
right to "decline to speak to the charges against him." John H. Langbein, The Privilege and
Common Law Criminal Procedure: The Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, supra note 19, at 96. In fact, it was not until the 1780s that
defense counsel became commonly used. Id. at 97. This is because prior to the right to counsel,
"the typical defendant [was left] with little alternative but to conduct his own defense." Id. at 95.
Scholars have noted that 1637 marks the true beginning of the notion of a privilege against self-
incrimination, see, e.g., GRISWOLD, supra note 21, at 3, although under Langbein's theory, the
privilege was not yet a recognized right. See Langbein, supra note 21, at 102-03. In that year,
"Freeborn John" Lilburne came before the Star Chamber on charges of having imported hereti-
cal and seditious material and refused to take the ex officio oath. GRISWOLD, supra note 21, at 3.
The Council of the Star Chamber sentenced him to be whipped for this refusal. Id. But in 1641,
the House of Commons found this punishment illegal. Id. Around this time, too, the ex officio
oath was abolished. See LEVY, supra note 21, at 271-82 for a more complete examination of the
case surrounding Lilburne.
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tion of the Fifth Amendment in 1791, a privilege against self-incrimi-
nation was generally recognized in the American colonies.30 In 1776,
Virginia included the privilege in its Bill of Rights, and soon after sev-
eral other states followed. 31 Each state and the United States govern-
ment modeled their self-incrimination clauses on the language of the
Virginia constitution, which has been termed "the product of bad
draftsmanship, ' 32 because its language appears to extend the right
only to a criminal defendant at his or her trial.33 Courts applied this
right, however, much more broadly than its language seems to allow;
therefore, its language does not necessarily "reveal original intent or
contemporaneous practice. '34 It is well recognized that the legislative
history pertaining to this clause is also virtually nonexistent. James
Madison, who is recognized as the Father of the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights, 35 did not provide an explanation anywhere as to his
intent regarding the self-incrimination clause, 36 nor did debate occur
about this clause at the First Congress. Despite a lack of evidence
about the scope of this privilege, it was initially suggested in both state
and federal cases that any constitutional formulation of the right did
not supersede or limit the right at common law. 37
This early suggestion did not decide how far the common law right
extended. American courts have been grappling with the scope of the
privilege almost since its inception; the controversy centers around
whether the right against self-incrimination applies only in the juris-
diction that compels the testimony, or whether the right applies in
any jurisdiction that might make use of the compelled testimony. For
guidance on the scope, the Supreme Court has looked to pre-constitu-
tional and early constitutional English cases. Two Supreme Court in-
terpretations of these cases have influenced the American courts'
perception of the privilege's scope, each arriving at opposite interpre-
tations. Those two cases are the 1931 case of United States v. Mur-
dock 38 and the 1964 case of Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New
30. GRISWOLD, supra note 21, at 6-7.
31. Id. The eight states, including Virginia, providing a right against self-incrimination in their
state constitutions were: Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Vermont, Massa-
chusetts, and New Hampshire. LEVY, supra note 20, at 250-51.
32. LEVY, supra note 20, at 250.
33. Id. at 249.
34. Id. at 250.
35. See id. at 1.
36. Id. at 248.
37. Id. at 256 n.16 (citing, inter alia, State v. Bailly, 2 N.J. 396 (1807); Miller v. Crayon, 2 S.C.L.
(2 Brev.) 108 (1806); LEVY, supra note 21, at 515-17 n.35).
38. 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
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York Harbor.39 An examination of the early cases in question will
serve to inform on the proper interpretation.
a. English Cases and Their Influence on American Law
In 1749, the Court of the Exchequer decided East India Co. v.
Campbell,40 in which a defendant in an English court refused to testify
based on his fear that his testimony could subject him to punishment
in Calcutta, India.41 The court allowed the privilege against self-in-
crimination to protect the witness, for "this court shall not oblige one
to discover that, which, if he answers in the affirmative, will subject
him to the punishment of a crime; for it is not material, that, if he
answers in the negative it will be no harm."'42 A year later, the court
addressed a similar issue in Brownsword v. Edwards,43 in which the
defendant refused to testify, claiming that her answers about a mar-
riage would subject her to penalties in the ecclesiastical courts.44 The
court granted her the right not to testify, finding that while her con-
duct did not subject her to punishment in that common law court, she
could be punished in the ecclesiastical court.45 The court held that
"[t]he general rule is, that no one is bound to answer so as to subject
himself to punishment, whether that punishment arises by the ecclesi-
astical law of the land. ' '46
About a century after Brownsword, the English Court of Chancery
decided King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 47 in which natives of Sicily
refused to testify because their testimony could subject them to prose-
cution in Sicily.48 The court denied their objection to testify, holding
that the court was unable to know whether the witness' testimony
would subject them to penal consequences in a foreign country; thus it
was unable to judge whether the objection was valid or not.4 9 More-
over, the court denied their objection based on the fact that the wit-
nesses themselves would have to willfully return to Sicily for
punishment to be imposed, which the witnesses were unlikely to do.5 0
Finally, in 1867, the English Court of Chancery Appeals decided
39. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
40. 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex. 1749).
41. Id. at 1010.
42. Id. at 1011.
43. 28 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1750).
44. Id. at 157.
45. Id. at 158.
46. Id.
47. 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch. 1851).
48. Id. at 116-17.
49. Id. at 128.
50. Id.
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United States v. McRae,51 in which the English defendant refused to
testify, asserting that he would otherwise subject himself to penalties
in the United States.52 The court granted the defendant the right not
to provide testimony that could incriminate him in the United
States. 53 While acknowledging that the facts were similar to those of
King of the Two Sicilies, the court distinguished McRae because the
defendant clearly violated a law of the United States for which he
could be prosecuted. 54 Thus, after McRae, the rule in England ap-
peared to allow for witnesses to claim a right against self-incrimina-
tion in one jurisdiction's courts only when those witnesses might
subject themselves to punishment or prosecution in the courts of an-
other jurisdiction.
b. Development of American Law
American cases addressing the scope of the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination have actually developed into two lines of in-
terpretation.5 5 The first line of cases, which until recently appeared to
have been overturned, has been termed the "same jurisdiction rule,"'5 6
under which the privilege extends as far as the jurisdiction of the sov-
ereign seeking the witness' testimony. The other line of cases sup-
ports the broader proposition that compelled testimony is prohibited
if it could subject the witness to criminal penalties. 57 In the latter line
of cases, disputes arose over the extent to which the prohibition could
be enforced, specifically whether it applied extraterritorially.
Until the 1964 landmark case of Murphy, the Supreme Court al-
lowed compulsion of testimony in one jurisdiction when the witness
feared criminal prosecution in another sovereign jurisdiction because
the states and the federal government were considered independent
sovereigns. 58 In Brown v. Walker,59 the Court found that a witness
who had been given immunity in federal court was bound t6 testify,
51. 3 L.R.-Ch. 79 (1867).
52. Id. at 79.
53. Id. at 87.
54. Id.
55. See Diane Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
nation in an International Context, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1201, 1208 (1998) (discussing one line of
cases in terms of a broad application of the privilege and the other line of cases in terms of the
"same jurisdiction rule," where the privilege is limited as to the jurisdiction compelling the
testimony).
56. See, e.g., id.
57. Id. at 1209.
58. See id. at 1208; Diego A. Rotsztain, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
nation and Fear of Foreign Prosecution, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1940, 1946-47 (1996).
59. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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despite his unfounded fear of prosecution in state court.60 In Jack v.
Kansas,61 a witness who had been provided state immunity, yet re-
fused to testify for fear of federal prosecution, was prohibited from
claiming the right against self-incrimination because the states had not
yet become bound by the Fifth Amendment. 62 The following year, the
Court considered a federal witness who had invoked the Fifth Amend-
ment right for fear of state prosecution in Hale v. Henkel.63 The
Court declared that "the only danger to be considered is one arising
within the same jurisdiction and under the same sovereignty." 64
Murdock specifically addressed the application of the Fifth Amend-
ment when the witness feared prosecution beyond the borders of the
United States, noting that "[t]he English rule of evidence against com-
pulsory self-incrimination ... does not protect witnesses against dis-
closing offenses in violation of the laws of another country. '' 65 The
Court also described the same jurisdiction rule, stating that when the
government compels a witness' testimony under complete immunity,
it can rightfully compel that testimony because the immunity invokes
the same protection as the privilege.66 Later cases relied on this rule
and reaffirmed that witnesses in one jurisdiction could be compelled
to testify, despite fears that they could incriminate themselves in an-
other jurisdiction.67
The second line of cases interprets the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation more liberally. In United States v. Saline Bank,68 the Court re-
60. Id. at 591. This opinion relied in part on an 1861 English case, Queen v. Boyes, 121 Eng.
Rep. 730 (Q.B. 1861), which held that the privilege did not apply when the danger of incriminat-
ing oneself was not "real and appreciable," or when the danger was "of an imaginary and unsub-
stantial character." Brown, 161 U.S. at 608. "Such dangers it was never the object of the
provision to obviate." Id.
61. 199 U.S. 372 (1905).
62. Id. The case of Malloy v. Hogan bound the states to the Fifth Amendment through the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
63. 201 U.S. 43, 50 (1906).
64. Id. at 69.
65. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 149 (1931).
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944), overruled by Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (emphasizing the distinct realms of the states
and the federal government and holding that even if a jurisdiction wrongfully compelled testi-
mony, another jurisdiction could appropriately use that testimony); see also Knapp v. Schweit-
zer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958), overruled by Murphy, 378 U.S. 52 (describing the Fifth Amendment's
purpose as protection from the powers of the federal government rather than a restraint on
compulsion of testimony, and emphasizing the federalist structure of the United States). But cf.
Knapp, 357 U.S. at 385 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Indeed things have now reached the point, as the
result of United States v. Murdock, Feldman, and the present case, where a person can be whip-
sawed into incriminating himself under both state and federal law even though there is a privi-
lege against self-incrimination in the Constitution of each.").
68. 26 U.S. 100 (1828).
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fused to allow the government to compel information from the
witnesses, holding that "they ought not to be compelled to discover or
set forth any matters, whereby they may impeach or accuse them-
selves of any offence or crime .. . . ",69 In finding for the defendants,
the Court stated that "[t]he rule clearly is, that a party is not bound to
make any discovery which would expose him to penalties . . 7o
While this case did not explicitly mention the Fifth Amendment, sev-
eral decades later in Ballman v. Fagin,71 the Court relied on Saline
Bank in concluding that the defendant could rightfully claim the privi-
lege before a federal grand jury because he could incriminate himself
under state law.72
In the 1964 landmark case of Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of
New York Harbor,73 the Court clarified what the government argued
was the "established rule" based on the decisions of Murdock, Knapp,
and Feldman. The government argued that the constitutional privi-
lege did not extend to a witness being compelled in one jurisdiction to
provide information that could be used to prosecute that witness in
another jurisdiction.74 The Court rejected this argument, holding that
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination extended to
witnesses who feared prosecution in either state or federal proceed-
ings, regardless of where the testimony was compelled. 75 On the same
day the Court decided Murphy, it held in Malloy v. Hogan76 that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies equally
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.77 That holding,
Murphy explained, called for a reexamination of the "established
rule. ' 78 Murphy was based on two lines of reasoning. First, the poli-
69. Id. at 102.
70. Id. at 104.
71. 200 U.S. 186 (1906).
72. Id. at 195-96.
73. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
74. Id. at 57. The witnesses in this case had been subpoenaed to testify before the New York
Harbor Water Commission. Id. at 53. When they refused to disclose certain information based
on the danger of incrimination, the state government granted them immunity from prosecution
in both New York and New Jersey. Id. They persisted in refusing to testify to certain informa-
tion, claiming the immunity did not extend to protection under federal law. Id. at 53-54. The
New Jersey Supreme Court held that despite the possibility of use of their testimony by the
federal government, the state did not violate the Constitution by compelling the witnesses to
testify. Id.
75. Id. at 77-78.
76. 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964).
77. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 53.
78. Id.at 57.
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cies behind the privilege79 are defeated if a witness can experience a
"whipsaw effect," whereby both the state and federal governments are
bound by the constitutional privilege, and yet he or she can be incrimi-
nated in either jurisdiction.80 The Court noted that this whipsaw ef-
fect could be especially strong during this time of "cooperative
federalism," whereby federal and state governments are working to-
gether to prosecute crime. 81 Second, the Court based its conclusion
on English and American case law.82 The Court reasoned that Mur-
dock was wrongly decided, in that neither its reasoning nor the au-
thority on which it based its decision supported its conclusion.83
Thus, the Court overruled the decisions whose reasoning depended on
Murdock, including both Knapp and Feldman.84
The settled rule about the application of the privilege against self-
incrimination appeared to apply cross-jurisdictionally after Murphy
because states and the federal government each had their own law
enforcement and court systems. The rule from Murphy, that a witness
cannot be compelled to testify in one jurisdiction if that testimony will
incriminate the witness in another jurisdiction, has influenced both the
courts and the witnesses who claim this right in cases of fear of foreign
prosecution. They have argued that if the United States is the jurisdic-
tion compelling the testimony and the Fifth Amendment applies
across jurisdictions, then the right after Murphy extends beyond
United States borders.
79. Id. at 55. The Court's discussion on this point provides a comprehensive and widely
quoted catalog of the policies, which is useful to recount:
The privilege against self-incrimination "registers an important advance in the develop-
ment of our liberty-'one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself
civilized."' It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusa-
tion, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisito-
rial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited
by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-
individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good
cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with
the individual to shoulder the entire load;" our respect for the inviolability of the
human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he
may lead a private life;" our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization
that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the
innocent."
Id. (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 55-56 (citing Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 385 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting)).
81. Id. at 56.
82. See, e.g., Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896);
United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100 (1828); Brownsword v. Edwards, 28
Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1750); East India Co. v. Campbell, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex. 1749).
83. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 73.
84. See id. at 74, 77.
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B. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Purposes and Rationales
Judge Friendly found that an examination of the policies behind the
privilege is essential in considering its scope because "the history of
the privilege does not settle the policy of the privilege. '85 Courts ad-
dressing the constitutional issue of whether fear of foreign prosecution
justifies the invocation of the right against self-incrimination often dis-
cuss the policy behind this privilege. 86 The Supreme Court, various
courts of appeals, and scholars assert a variety of rationales, which
often are simply placed into two categories. The first category ad-
dresses the privilege as an individual and personal right; the second
identifies the privilege as a protection against governmental over-
reaching.8 7 Courts commonly identify both approaches but tend to
prefer the merits of one over those of the other. Thus, a lack of cohe-
sion or agreement exists among the circuits regarding which approach
prevails. 88 The approach a court takes regarding the justification of
the privilege may be determinative as to whether or not it decides to
extend the privilege to witnesses who fear foreign prosecution.
When colonists came to America, they brought with them the no-
tion of nemo tenetur prodere seipsum,89 which immediately took root
in the original states and ultimately in the Constitution through the
85. Friendly, supra note 28, at 679 (quoting 8 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 at 295 (Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961)).
86. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212-13 (1988); Murphy v. United States, 378
U.S. 52, 55-56 (1964); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956), cited in Murphy, 378
U.S. 52; United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1427 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Balsys, 119
F.3d 122, 1.29-30 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067, 1070 (10th Cit. 1969); United States
v. Lileikis, 899 F. Supp 802, 804 (D. Mass. 1995).
87. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (offering a comprehensive list of rationales); Balsys, 119 F.3d
at 129-30 (dividing the purposes into three categories of purposes: advancing the value of indi-
vidual dignity and privacy; promoting the value of the American criminal justice system; and
protecting against governmental overreaching); Araneta, 794 F.2d 920, 926 (4th Cir. 1986) (as-
serting the dual goals of the Self-Incrimination Clause as those of "protect[ing] individual dignity
and conscience" and of "preserv[ing] the accusatorial nature of our system of criminal justice,"
based on the fundamental values listed by Justice Golberg in Murphy). See generally GRISWOLD,
supra note 21, at 7-10 (focusing on the privilege as a protection of the "dignity and intrinsic
importance of the individual," and as "an expression of one of the fundamental decencies in the
relation we have developed between government and man").
88. Prior to the recent Supreme Court decision of United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218
(1998), the two most recent examples exemplifying the disagreement in the courts of appeals
were Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419 and Balsys, 119 F.3d 122. The former rejected the witness's conten-
tion that the main purpose of the privilege is to protect the privacy and dignity of individuals,
and thus gives him a right against the world not to testify. Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1457. The latter
rejected the notion that "a single cardinal purpose" exists for the Fifth Amendment and recog-
nized each of the values, considering instead, whether extending the privilege to a case where a
defendant fears foreign prosecution promotes or defeats the purposes. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 129.
89. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
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Self-Incrimination Clause.90 Examining the Constitution's history and
the framers' intent with regard to the Fifth Amendment reveals few
clues about the rationale behind its inclusion in the Bill of Rights. 91
Perhaps this is due to the fact that by the time it was incorporated into
the Bill of Rights, it had become "a self-evident truth" that did not
require an explanation. 92 Despite the paucity of information explicitly
lending itself to a discussion of the privilege against self-incrimination,
the two rationales mentioned above emerged as justification for this
clause.
1. The Privilege as an Individual and Personal Right
The ideals of personal dignity and privacy underlie many, if not all,
protections in the Bill of Rights, at least to some extent. The Consti-
tution's framers were concerned with preventing the indignities suf-
fered under the rule of the English monarchy in Great Britain, and
based on this motive, they developed a Constitution that would secure
individual liberties. 93 The history of the right's development reveals
that it coincided with the abolition of torture as a means of compelling
information about criminal activity. 94 As the Supreme Court noted in
Ullmann v. United States,95 the privilege against self-incrimination
"registers an important advance in the development of our liberty-
'one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civi-
lized."' 96 Justice Goldberg eloquently phrased the rationale in the
Murphy opinion, stating:
[It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspira-
tions: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; ... our sense
of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requir-
ing the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is
shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its
contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load;" [and] our
respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the
90. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
92. LEVY, supra note 21, at 430.
93. See id. at 431. As Levy noted, Chief Judge Magruder stated: "Our forefathers, when they
wrote this provision into the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, had in mind a lot of history
which has been largely forgotten to-day." Id. The Framers recognized that liberty was not possi-
ble without means to protect the criminally accused and that tyranny comes about by using
criminal law to destroy opposition. Id.
94. GRISWOLD, supra note 21, at 7.
95. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
96. Id. at 426 (quoting GRISWOLD, supra note 21, at 7).
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right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life."'97
Some judges and scholars discuss the underlying policy in terms of a
"rights-based" rationale, and attribute its basis to natural law. 98 It has
been said that Justice Goldberg's "cruel trilemma" is "not any less
cruel nor any less imposed" when testimony is compelled domestically
in order to be used ultimately extraterritorially. 99
The privilege has been further justified according to the ideal that it
is essentially and inherently cruel to compel an individual to expose
his or her own guilt.100 To do so would lead the individual to a feeling
of personal degradation. 1 1 Reflected in this notion is the American
ideal that the most valued qualities in a free society are based upon
the sense of personal independence. 10 2
2. The Privilege as a Protection Against Governmental
Overreaching
Colonists were determined to guard against a tyrannical govern-
ment. With the memory of the English government's tyranny still
fresh in their minds, the Framers adopted the notion that it is some-
times better for a crime to go unpunished than for a criminal case to
be tried based on the suspect's own disclosure. 0 3 The rationale be-
hind this ideal is again expressed by Justice Goldberg in Murphy:
[the privilege against self-incrimination] reflects ... our preference
for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminaljustice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by
inhumane treatment and abuses; ... and our realization that the
privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty" is often "a pro-
tection to the innocent." 1°4
As the first rationale has been described as "rights-based," the second
one has been termed a "systemic" rationale, whose "purpose is to en-
97. Murphy v. United States, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citations omitted).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1460 (11th Cir. 1997) (Birch, J., dissenting)
(contending that "[t]his ... rationale can be described as rights-based, as it focuses on the indi-
vidual's interest in privacy and freedom from cruelty").
99. United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 112, 130 (2d Cir. 1997).
100. MAYERS, supra note 28, at 160 (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896)
(Field, J., dissenting)). Justice Field's explanation about the purposes of the Fifth Amendment
may have been considered the most articulate pronouncement until Justice Golberg's in Murphy.
Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427 (1956) (quoting Hoffman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479, 486 (1950)).
104. Murphy v. United States, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citations omitted).
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sure the integrity of our criminal justice system by imposing limits on
the power of government as a prosecutor.' 10 5
While these two rationales are accepted among authorities as dis-
tinct justifications or purposes, it is sometimes hard to separate them.
The Bill of Rights exists both for the protection of the individual and
as a "bill of restraints" on the government. 0 6 As one Fifth Amend-
ment scholar noted, the framers included this clause because "govern-
ment is but an instrument of man, its sovereignty held in
subordination to his rights .... [T]he citizen is the master of his gov-
ernment, not its subject.' 10 7
3. Implications of the Underlying Rationales
Ultimately, the two purposes discussed above force the courts to
use a balancing test. It is clear that in order for the Fifth Amendment
privilege to maintain any meaning, courts must prohibit the govern-
ment from both compelling and using the implicating statements.
Only by prohibiting the government from compelling self-incriminat-
ing statements will the individual's personal dignity and privacy be
protected; only by prohibiting the use of the compelled statements will
the individual be protected against an overzealous government.
This dual protection is necessary because the prohibition against
compulsion is not absolute. Domestically, the government can compel
a witness to testify without overreaching its power or violating the
Fifth Amendment by employing one of two instruments: immunity
and a grand jury secrecy provision. The government often claims that
these devices apply not only to domestic proceedings, but also to cases
in which a defendant refuses to testify due to his fear of foreign prose-
cution.108 In cases within the United States jurisdiction, the use of
immunity statutes and grand jury secrecy protects both the govern-
ment's need to obtain testimony and the witness' constitutional right
against self-incrimination. Historically, once the privilege against self-
105. United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1460 (11th Cir. 1997) (Birch, J., dissenting).
106. Id. In his dissent, Judge Birch noted that the "systemic rationale, which essentially en-
sures that our system of criminal justice is fair, also serves the end of human dignity by protect-
ing the individual from an overbearing government." Id. at 1460 n.14. On the other hand, "the
rights-based rationale also guarantees that they system is fair... thereby garnering the trust and
confidence of the governed-and thus furthering systemic ends." Id.
107. LEVY, supra note 21, at 31.
108. See, e.g., In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d 1191 (11th Cir. 1985);
In re Nigro, 705 F.2d 1224 (10th Cir. 1982); In re Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982); United
States v. Brummitt, 665 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn.
1972).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:987
incrimination became an established part of the law, it became inap-
plicable to witnesses when they were granted immunity.'0 9
Kastigar v. United States" ° addressed the compatibility of immunity
statutes with the Fifth Amendment right and found that they provide
coextensive protection."' The Court held that if the government has
granted a witness immunity from the use of the testimony and its
fruits, it can compel testimony from that witness without violating
Fifth Amendment principles."l 2 The government need not provide
full transactional immunity.113 For the government not to violate the
right against self-incrimination, the immunity must provide the wit-
nesses only as much protection as the Fifth Amendment would; it
need not provide more."14 Problems arise in cases where defendants'
fear of foreign prosecution causes them to refuse to testify despite
grants of immunity from the government since immunity from the
United States government does not extend beyond its borders."15
Courts must then decide whether the defendants should be held in
contempt.
109. LEVY, supra note 21, at 495.
110. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
111. Id. at 445-46. The most common statutes the government uses to grant immunity are 18
U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003.
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to
testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to-(1) a court
or grand jury of the United States ... and the person presiding over the proceeding
communicates to the witness an order issued under this title, the witness may not refuse
to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination ....
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1994).
(a) In the case of any individual who has been ... called to testify... at any proceeding
before ... a court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is ... held shall
issue ... an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other informa-
tion which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, such order to become effective as provided in § 6002 of this title.
18 U.S.C. § 6003.
112. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453. Use and derivative use immunity prohibits the government
from using the compelled testimony to subsequently prosecute; evidence gleaned from other
sources may be used to prosecute subsequently. Id.
113. Transactional immunity is immunity from prosecution for a particular transaction, and it
grants much broader protection than use immunity, which does not prohibit prosecution for a
crime if the government independently obtains evidence. Id.; see LEVY, supra note 20, at 308-09.
114. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
115. See, e.g., Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972);
Araneta, 794 F.2d 920, 926 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege only
applies where both the compelling and the using sovereigns are bound by the Fifth Amend-
ment); In re Gilboe, 699 F.2d 71, 74-75 (2d Cir. 1982) (failing to decide the applicability of the
grant of immunity on a foreign sovereign because the witness did not reasonably fear foreign
prosecution).
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In addition, the government has often argued that witnesses can be
compelled to testify before a grand jury without fear that their testi-
mony will be revealed to a foreign country based on Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 6(e). 116 This rule provides that grand jury testimony
must remain secret, except in certain cases. Courts, however, often
find that this "protection" is ineffective since there is no guarantee
that the testimony will not be inadvertently disclosed. Many courts
addressing this issue have found that 6(e) does not provide sufficient
protection against prosecution in foreign criminal proceedings. 1 7
Problems arise with the use of the immunity statutes and grand jury
rule because foreign governments are not bound by the Constitution.
The use of these tools domestically demonstrates a respect for the
privilege as an individual right not to be criminally prosecuted based
on one's own testimony, while recognizing the important interest of
the government in compelling certain testimony.
C. Constitutional Concerns
1. United States Constitution Generally and its Application to
Resident Aliens
It is well established that resident aliens of the United States may
claim the protection of the United States Constitution.1 8 As the
Supreme Court explained in Bridges v. Wixon, 119 the United States
Constitution extends no rights to aliens when they initially enter this
country, and the government has the right to exclude them for any
116. In essence, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that individuals involved in
grand jury proceedings, including grand jurors, stenographers, attorneys for the government, or
those to whom disclosure is made pursuant to the exceptions are is subject to a general rule of
secrecy. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). This rule provides for disclosure for attorneys for the govern-
ment for use in the performance of the attorney's duty and certain government personnel who
assist an attorney for the government. Id. The disclosed information pursuant to the attorney's
may only be used for the purpose of assisting the attorney for the government duty to enforce
criminal law. Id.
117. See, e.g., Araneta, 794 F.2d at 925 (holding that Rule 6(e) would not adequately protect
witnesses from disclosure to the Philippine government); United States v. Flanagan, 691 F.2d
116, 123 (2d Cir. 1982) (determining that Rule 6(e) does not insure that grand jury testimony will
not be disclosed to a foreign sovereign and thus does not provide sufficient protection to the
witness claiming the fear); In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1082 (D. Conn. 1972) (finding that
American courts using Rule 6(e) cannot sufficiently protect a witness from foreign use of her
compelled testimony). But see In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that
because Rule 6(e) provides for secrecy of grand jury proceedings, there is no substantial risk of
foreign prosecution); In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (10th Cir. 1969) (asserting that any
evidence the witness would disclose to the grand jury would not be available to the Canadian
government because of the application of Rule 6(e)).
118. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring).
119. Id.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
reason. 120 In other words, "the Bill of Rights is a futile authority for
the alien seeking admission for the first time to these shores.' 121
Aliens, however, are fully vested with constitutional rights and protec-
tions once they have lawfully come into this country to reside.'22 In-
cluded among these rights are the First Amendment,123 which allows
aliens freedom of speech and of religion, as well as the Fifth Amend-
ment, 2 4 which gives them, inter alia, the right not to serve as wit-
nesses against themselves if there is a potential for criminal
prosecution. Ultimately, once aliens are lawfully in this country, the
Constitution does not distinguish them from citizens. 12 5
A few years after Bridges, the Court affirmed this notion by reiter-
ating that the Fifth Amendment protects aliens who are "lawful per-
manent resident[s]" of the United States and who are established
there physically.' 26 If these conditions are not met, aliens can right-
fully expect not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.'2 7 Due process must be given even if the government
later desires to expel or deport them, 2 8 for they must be given the
opportunity to be heard.129 Based on these assessments by the Court,
it is evident that constitutional protections extend to permanent
United States residents who lack citizenship.
2. Interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's Clause of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination
As stated previously, the Self-Incrimination Clause provides: "No
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.' 30 Problems arise, however, in discerning what con-
stitutes a criminal proceeding, who is protected, and the proper scope
of the privilege. For instance, an individual involved in a deportation
proceeding, which is civil, could be deported based on testimony he or
she provided. 131 Logically, because deportation proceedings are of a
civil nature, deportees would not be entitled to the same constitu-
120. Id. at 160 (citing Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904)).
121. Id. at 161.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 161.
125. Id.
126. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953).
127. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 2.
128. Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 596-97.
129. Id. at 598.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 2.
131. See I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984) (stating that the absence of a
Miranda warning does not render a statement inadmissible in a deportation trial).
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tional protections guaranteed to criminal defendants. 132 But as the
Supreme Court held in Kastigar, the Fifth Amendment "protects
against any disclosures, which the witness reasonably believes could
be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that
might be so used.' 33
On the other hand, the self-incrimination clause need not be ap-
proached so literally. The Kastigar Court held that a witness facing a
legitimate possibility of conviction (in either the current or a subse-
quent proceeding) may invoke the privilege "in any proceeding, civil
or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory;
.... "134 Thus, for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause, certain
proceedings that are not criminal in nature may become "criminal
cases" if the testimony sought in one proceeding potentially could
subject the individual to criminal charges in a later proceeding, based
on that earlier compelled testimony. 35 This rule most certainly would
apply to a deportee facing domestic criminal prosecution. Unfortu-
nately, this does not resolve the issue of whether a deportation pro-
ceeding, in which the deportee fears potential foreign criminal
prosecution, may assume a criminal nature for purposes of allowing
the deportee to invoke the Fifth Amendment to protect him from that
future criminal action. 136
3. How Courts Determine When Fear of Foreign Prosecution
Justifies Invocation of Self-Incrimination Clause
The Supreme Court established a standard by which a witness can
claim the privilege against self-incrimination. This privilege prohibits
compulsion of his or her testimony if there is a real and substantial
danger that such testimony will be used against the witness in a crimi-
nal prosecution.' 37 Application to a fear of foreign prosecution calls
for an evaluation of two preliminary steps prior to addressing the con-
stitutional issue. First, the court must determine whether the conduct
about which the witness is being compelled to testify might form the
132. Id. at 1038-39.
133. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972) (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 444.
135. Id.
136. United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1427 (11th Cir. 1997).
137. Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972). This
standard was invoked in Zicarelli, but the Court found it unnecessary to address the constitution-
ality of the issue because the witness failed to demonstrate a "real and substantial fear" of prose-
cution in a foreign jurisdiction. Id. at 478-79.
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basis of a criminal conviction under foreign law.138 Second, the court
must determine whether the defendant's fear of foreign prosecution is
real and substantial. 139 Only after deciding that the fear is real and
substantial does the court reach the issue of whether the Constitution
allows one who fears foreign prosecution to invoke the Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination. 140
If a court decides that a witness' conduct will not subject him or her
to foreign criminal prosecution, then there is no constitutional issue to
consider.14' For instance, if no criminal statute existed in a foreign
country under which the witness could be prosecuted, then he or she
would not be able to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege. Rather,
the witness would simply be involved in a civil proceeding with no
possibility of criminal prosecution. 142 On the other hand, if the court
were to find that the crime is punishable in certain foreign countries to
which the witness may be deported, then the court must consider the
constitutionality of extending the Fifth Amendment protection. 143
The danger the witness fears must be real and substantial, for the
Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply if the potential for prose-
cution and conviction is merely "remote and speculative."' 44 In decid-
ing cases in which the defendant fears foreign prosecution, courts of
appeals have been guided by Zicarelli, which called for the examina-
tion of several factors in determining whether the fear is real and sub-
stantial.145 In re Flanagan,46 which built upon Zicarelli, provides a
helpful list of factors that courts consider in determining whether the
138. See In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d 1191, 1198 (11th Cir. 1985)
(addressing the application of the privilege to foreign proceedings and finding that the defendant
must show first that the information sought through testimony would incriminate the defendant
under foreign law and second that the fear is real and substantial rather than merely
speculative).
139. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896) ("[A] witness' fear of conviction on the
basis of his testimony must be reasonable, real, and appreciable"); Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 478
(finding that the witness must face a "real danger" of conviction to invoke the privilege because
the privilege does not protect against "remote and speculative possibilities").
140. See Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 478; Araneta, 794 F.2d 920, 923 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Parker, 411
F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969).
141. See, e.g., Zicarelli, 406 U.S. 472; In re Chevrier, 748 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1984); United
States v. Brummitt, 665 F.2d 521, 525-26 (5th Cir. 1981).
142. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
143. See Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 478.
144. Id.; see In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d 1191, 1199 (11th Cir.
1985) (finding possibility that a foreign country will seek extradition of the defendant with which
United States authorities would comply so speculative a danger, as that described in Zicarelli,
that the defendant was precluded from invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Joudis, 800 F.2d 159, 161-62 (7th Cir. 1986); President's
Comm'n on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d at 1199; In re Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116,121 (2d Cir. 1982).
146. 691 F.2d 116.
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witness' fear is real and substantial: (1) "whether there is an existing
or potential foreign prosecution against him;" 147 (2) "what foreign
charges could be filed against him; ' 148 (3) "whether prosecution of
them would be initiated or furthered by his testimony; '149 (4)
"whether any such charges would entitle the foreign jurisdiction to
have him extradited from the United States;' 150 and (5) "whether
there is a likelihood that his testimony given here would be disclosed
to the foreign government.' 15' These factors are considered once the
witness has been granted immunity by the United States government
but refuses to testify because the immunity protection extends only as
far as American borders.
The constitutional issue is finally addressed after a court determines
that the defendant's fear of foreign prosecution is real and substantial,
based on the aforementioned factors.152 Courts infrequently address
this question because a defendant's fear of prosecution rarely rises to
the level of substantial. 53 Prior to Balsys, the Supreme Court had
addressed this specific issue only once before, in United States v. Zi-
carelli,154 where it determined that the defendant did not face a sub-
stantial risk of incrimination under foreign law.' 55 Thus, lower courts
were largely left to their own devices. 156
147. Id. at 121.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.; see In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d 1191, 1199 (11th Cir.
1985) (providing a similar formulation of factors).
152. See, e.g., Araneta, 794 F.2d 920, 928 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Brummitt, 665 F.2d
521 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969); United States v. Ragauskas, No.
94 C 2325, 1995 WL 86640 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
153. See, e.g., In re Chevrier, 748 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.
1982); In re Mishima, 507 F. Supp. 131 (D. Alaska 1981).
154. 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
155. Id. at 479-80.
156. These lower courts have followed a variety of principles long expounded in Supreme
Court decisions, which included analogizing to opinions that were decided according to the state-
federal government distinction, such as Murphy; however, any guidance specifically applying to
the privilege in cases of foreign prosecution has often called for interpreting English common
law and early American cases, which is not uniform. Judge Carnes, in United States v. Gecas had
urged the Supreme Court to decide this issue. 120 F.3d 1419, 1484 (11th Cir. 1997) (Carnes, J.,
dissenting). He noted that the arguments advanced by proponents on both sides of the issue are
compelling, and circuit opinions have explored all possible arguments. Id. But, because of the
issue's "fundamental importance" and the fact that it is gaining "quantitative importance" in
light of the internationalization of crime as well as of law enforcement, the issue should no
longer percolate in the circuits. Id.
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II. UNITED STATES V. BALSYS
A. Facts
Aloyzas Balsys was an eighty-six-year-old resident alien of Lithua-
nia who resided in Woodhaven, New York.157 He arrived in the
United States on June 30, 1961, pursuant to his application for an im-
migrant visa and alien registration, which he filed on May 2, 1961, at
the American Consulate in Liverpool, England.158 During the appli-
cation process, Balsys was questioned about his activities and employ-
ment during World War II.159 He stated that he served as a
"Sergeant-major instructor" for the Lithuanian army from 1934
through 1940.160 Additionally, he stated that between 1940 and 1944,
he lived in hiding in Plateliai, Lithuania.161 Balsys swore under oath
that the information he provided in his application was "true and com-
plete. ' 162 He also declared that if he made any "willfully false or mis-
leading statement[s]" or concealed any material fact, he could subject
himself to criminal prosecution in or deportation from the United
States.163 Based on this declaration, the American consulate granted
him an immigrant visa pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952.164
The OSI had an interest in prosecuting residents suspected of being
Nazi war criminals165 and suspected that Balsys illegally entered the
United States. 166 The OSI believed that he was not in hiding in Lithu-
ania from 1940 to 1944, but rather had been a member of the Lithua-
nian Security Police, Saugumas, in Vilnius, Lithuania.1 67 The
Saugumas were "responsible for arresting, detaining and turning over
for execution Jews, those who aided Jews, suspected Communists, and
other civilians .... "168 If Balsys had been a Saugumas member and
157. United States v. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. 588, 590 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
158. Id.; Appellee's Brief at 3, United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1996) (No. 96-
6144). Balsys applied for admission to the United States pursuant to the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994). See Balsys, 918 F. Supp. at 590.
159. Appellee's Brief at 3.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Balsys, 918 F. Supp. at 588 n.2 (citing Respondent's Application for Immigrant Visa
and Alien Registration, Exhibit D to the Government's Petition).
164. Appellee's Brief at 3; see Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1201
(1994).
165. See supra note 1.
166. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. at 591.
167. Appellee's Brief at 4.
168. Id.
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assisted the Nazi forces in persecuting Jews and others, he could be
eligible for deportation. 169
Pursuant to its investigation of Balsys' wartime activities, the direc-
tor of the Department of Justice's OSI issued an administrative sub-
poena on October 14, 1993, directing Balsys to testify and produce
documents concerning his activities during World War II and his im-
migration to the United States.170 At the government's deposition on
November 16, 1993, the OSI questioned Balsys about his residence in
Europe during the war, his association with the Lithuanian police and
political groups, and any knowledge of or participation in the persecu-
tion of Jews and others during the Nazi occupation of Lithuania.17 1
While Balsys did appear at the deposition, he refused to provide any
information beyond his name and address, asserting the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination based on his fear of prosecu-
tion in Lithuania, Israel, or Germany, each of which has a statute
relating to the prosecution of Nazi war criminals.172 In addition, he
refused to produce any documents except his alien registration
card.' 73
B. Procedural History
Subsequent to the deposition and Balsys' refusal to comply with the
government's requests for information and documents, the govern-
ment filed a petition in the District Court for the Eastern District of
New York to enforce the subpoena.174 Balsys objected to the sub-
poena's enforcement because he maintained that he had a real and
substantial fear of prosecution in Lithuania, Israel, and Germany. 75
169. The relevant statutes, under which Balsys would be subject to deportation, are 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(E) and § 1251(a)(4)(D) for participating in the "persecution of any person because
of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion." § 1182(a)(3)(E). In addition, the govern-
ment argued that Balsys might be subject to deportation for lying on his immigration application,
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(c)(i) and 1251(a)(1)(A). See Balsys, 119 F.3d at 124.
170. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 125.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 124-25.
173. Id. at 125.
174. Appellee's Brief at 4, Balsys, 119 F.3d 122 (No. 96-6144). Pursuant to the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, the Immigration and Naturalization Service is authorized to ques-
tion aliens, issue subpoenas, and require document production concerning immigration proceed-
ings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1994).
175. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 125. Israel could criminally prosecute Balsys under its Nazis and Nazi
Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 1950, S.H. 57, a law which Israel has applied extraterritorially.
United States v. Balsys, 918 F. Supp., 588, 594-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). The law punishes by death
"crime[s] against the Jewish people," "crime[s] against humanity" and "war crime[s]." Id. at 594
n.11. Lithuania employs its Law Concerning Responsibility for Genocide of the People of Lithu-
ania, Art. 1 (1992), to punish Nazi war crimes. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. at 593 n.9. The law states
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The district court held that Balsys was not entitled to invoke the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination 176 despite the "real
and substantial danger" of foreign prosecution in Lithuania and
Israel. 177 The court also concluded that regardless of the Fifth
Amendment's application, Balsys had waived the privilege when he
first applied for immigration and answered the questions for govern-
ment officials.' 78 Thus, he was ordered to testify before the OSI. 179
The court also ordered Balsys to produce the documents subpoenaed
because he made no showing that they would be of a testimonial na-
ture and would incriminate him merely by acknowledging possession
of them.180
Balsys appealed this decision based upon his right to invoke the
Fifth Amendment, denying that he had waived the privilege in immi-
gration procedures. 181 On appeal, neither party challenged the find-
ing that Balsys faced a real and substantial danger of foreign
prosecution. 182 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated
the order of the district court, finding that witnesses with a real and
substantial fear of foreign prosecution have the right to invoke the
protections of the privilege against self-incrimination. 183 The court
concluded that Balsys did not waive this right because during inter-
vening periods of time, changes had occurred in immigration law and
procedures and in the criminal laws of the United States, Lithuania,
and Israel.184 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided the
case on June 25, 1998.185
that it is retroactive and does not apply a statute of. limitations to individuals who committed
crimes against humanity during the Nazi era. Id. (citing Article 3 of the statute). Punishments
include incarceration, confiscation of property, and the death penalty. Id. (citing Article 1 of the
statute). Germany invokes its murder statute, Art. 211, Nr. 1 StGB, to prosecute Nazi war
criminals, under which the penalty is life imprisonment. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. at 594. As with the
Lithuanian statute, this one does not apply a statute of limitations. Id.
176. Id. at 591, 596.
177. The district court found that while the German murder statute has been used to prose-
cute persons suspected of crimes against Jewish people, it is unclear whether it applies to non-
German citizens who allegedly committed such acts outside of German jurisdiction, and thus
whether Balsys faced a real danger of prosecution in Germany. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. at 594.
Because of this uncertainty, the court's findings as to the application of the Fifth Amendment
privilege apply to Balsys's fear of prosecution only in Israel and Lithuania. Id. at 595.
178. Id. at 600.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing In re Grand Jury (Markowitz), 603 F.2d 469, 477 (3d Cir. 1979)).
181. Id.
182. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 126.
183. Id. at 124.
184. Id. at 140.
185. United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998). It is significant to note that less than two
months after the Second Circuit handed down its decision, the Eleventh Circuit faced a virtually
1010 [Vol. 48:987
1999] FIFTH AMENDMENT & FOREIGN PROSECUTION 1011
C. The Majority Opinion
Justice Souter delivered the majority opinion, in which seven jus-
tices joined as to three parts of the opinion, and five justices joined the
remaining two parts, which held that concern with foreign prosecution
exceeds the scope of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-in-
crimination. 186 Neither party disputed that the government sought to
"compel" Balsys to testify in a manner that would make him be a
witness against himself.187 The parties also did not dispute that Balsys
maintained a reasonable fear of criminal prosecution in Lithuania or
Israel. 188 Thus, the issue the Supreme Court faced was whether "any
criminal case," the language of the Fifth Amendment's protection, ap-
plied to fear of criminal prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction.' 89
1. Balsys' Constitutional Rights
The majority first acknowledged that the government sought to
compel testimony from Balsys, which might make him "a witness
against himself,"'190 which is conduct the Fifth Amendment was in-
tended to protect in a criminal proceeding.19' The majority also noted
that the privilege applied in any proceeding, civil or criminal, if the
information sought could subsequently be used against the witness in
a state or federal criminal proceeding. 192 The Court accepted that
Balsys' fear of criminal prosecution was reasonable and then framed
the issue as whether the scope of the privilege against fear of criminal
prosecution extended to foreign jurisdictions. 193
2. The Same-Sovereign Rule of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination: What "Any Criminal Case" Means
After discussing Balsys' constitutional rights, the Court concluded
that, in the context of the entire Fifth Amendment, the self-incrimina-
tion clause must be read to apply only to those governments bound by
parallel case, when it heard United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419 (11th Cir. 1997). In this six-to-
five decision, the court refused to extend to Gecas the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at
1422. Both the majority and dissent provided lengthy and compelling arguments. It is quite
likely that this split in the circuits on two factually parallel cases influenced the Supreme Court's
decision to grant certiorari.
186. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2221.
187. Id. at 2222.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
191. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2222.
192. Id. (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972); McCarthy v. Arndstein,
266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924)).
193. Id.
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the Fifth Amendment. Justice Souter first answered Balsys' argu-
ment, which focused on the facial language of the self-incrimination
clause, "any criminal case."'1 94 The Court rejected his argument,
which had contrasted the Sixth Amendment's clear application to do-
mestic criminal proceedings with the apparently broader Fifth
Amendment reference to any criminal proceeding. 195 Instead, the
Court found that a proper reading of the privilege depends upon the
"cardinal rule to construe provisions in context."'1 96 The other Fifth
Amendment guarantees are implicated only upon action of the gov-
ernment bound by this amendment. 197 Thus, the Court reasoned that
in context with these other guarantees, the framers would not have
intended the self-incrimination clause to have a broader
application.198
The Court explained the modifier "any" as serving to contrast the
self-incrimination clause with the grand jury clause, which limits itself
to cases involving "capital or otherwise infamous crime[s]."' 99 The
Court found a contextual reading appropriate, based on the fact that
there is "no helpful legislative history, and ... there was no different
common law practice at the time of the Framing. o200 The Court con-
cluded, therefore, that the privilege against self-incrimination may be
invoked only when the witness reasonably feared prosecution by a ju-
risdiction whose power is limited by the clause, which is the idea of
"same-sovereign jurisdiction."' 20 1
a. Supreme Court Precedent of United States v. Murdock Upheld
The Court noted that the Bill of Rights was a limit on the power of
the federal government only and not to individual state govern-
ments.202 Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation, implica-
tion of the privilege when one feared state prosecution would have
been "unlikely" and "improbable. '20 3 The Court then discussed the
194. The full clause provides that "[N]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
195. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2222.
196. Id. at 2223.
197. Id. The other Fifth Amendment provisions include the guarantees of a grand jury pro-
ceeding, of a defense against double jeopardy, of due process of law, and of just compensation
for the taking of property. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
198. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2223.
199. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2224 (quoting Chief Justice Marshall in Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Balti-
more, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833)).
203. Id.
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"precursors" of Balsys, in which witnesses invoked the federal privi-
lege based on a fear that their testimony could be used in a state pro-
ceeding.204 It noted that only a few early cases addressed this cross-
jurisdictional application of the Fifth Amendment clause. 20 5 The
Court discussed that in each of those cases, the holdings were based
on the fact that it was unlikely that the testimony would be used by
the other jurisdiction.206
The Court relied on United States v. Murdock,20 7 which held that a
witness cannot refuse to testify in a federal proceeding based on the
possibility that such testimony might incriminate the witness under
state law.208 The Court cited Murdock's interpretation of the "English
rule of evidence against compulsory self-incrimination," on which the
Fifth Amendment privilege is based.20 9 It stated that the English rule
does not protect witnesses in one jurisdiction from the disclosure of
offenses of another country's laws.210 In addition, it quoted Murdock
for the proposition that a witness who receives absolute immunity
against prosecution by the government compelling the testimony is
afforded the same protection as if the witness had invoked the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 211 The Court recognized that this
opinion received support in Knapp v. Schweitzer,212 which held that a
state is justified in compelling a witness to testify, despite the possibil-
ity that the testimony could incriminate the witness in a federal
proceeding. 213
204. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2224.
205. Id. at 2224-25. The Court cited Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (holding that "'the
possibility that information given by the witness might be used' by the other government is, as a
matter of law, 'a danger so unsubstantial and remote' that it fails to trigger the right to invoke
the privilege"); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905) (imposing a contempt order on the witness,
who invoked the privilege in a state proceeding based on a fear of federal prosecution, since the
privilege applies only when prosecution is feared by the same jurisdiction in which the privilege
is invoked, but finding that the witness had no reasonable fear of federal prosecution); and
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896) (noting that in raising the privilege in a federal proceeding
based on a fear of state prosecution was not necessary since the federal immunity protected the
witness from state prosecution).
206. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2224-25.
207. 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
208. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2224.
209. Id. at 2224-25.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
213. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2225 (citing Knapp, 357 U.S. 371, overruled by Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964)).
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The Court next addressed the lack of uniformity among the cir-
Cuits,214 as reflected in the two lines of cases:215 those supporting the
"same jurisdiction" rule, including Hale v. HenkelP'6 and Brown v.
Walker,217 and those holding that the privilege applies in federal pro-
ceedings when the witnesses feared prosecution under a state law, in-
cluding United States v. Saline Bank218 and Ballmann v. Fagin.219 The
Court asserted that the latter line of cases was not inconsistent with
Murdock.220 First, while Saline Bank held that "'a party is not bound
to make any discovery which would expose him to penalties,"' the
Court never discussed the Fifth Amendment.221 Moreover, while
Ballman found that the witness may have been allowed the privilege's
protection based on fear of state prosecution, it was overruled by Hale
v. Henkel two months after it was decided.222 The Court essentially
found that any inconsistency was ultimately superceded by
Murdock.223
b. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor-Right
Decision, Flawed Rationale
The Court next examined the viability of Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n of New York Harbor,224 which overruled Murdock by hold-
ing that witnesses in a state proceeding who had been granted state
immunity could be compelled to testify, despite their fear of federal
prosecution, because the privilege against self-incrimination barred
the federal government from using the state testimony or its fruits in a
federal prosecution.225 After Murphy, the Fifth Amendment guaran-
214. Id.; see Respondent's Brief at 7, Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218 (No. 97-873), available in 1998
WL 139846 ("The earlier overruled decisions which refused to protect witnesses from testifying
based upon the fear that their testimony would be used against them in another sovereign's
prosecution were decided on obsolete grounds."); Amicus Brief at 16, Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218
(No. 97-873), available in 1998 WL 136442 (demonstrating that precedent actually reveals two
lines of Supreme Court cases, one line prohibiting a federal court from compelling a witness to
testify to potentially incriminating information under state law and the other line limiting the
privilege to testimony that might incriminate the witness only in the same jurisdiction that was
compelling the testimony).
215. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2225; see Amann, supra note 55, at 1208-12 (contrasting the two lines
of cases).
216. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
217. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
218. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100, 104 (1828).
219. 200 U.S. 186 (1906).
220. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2225.
221. Id. (citation omitted).
222. Id. (citing Ballman, 200 U.S. at 195-96).
223. Id.
224. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
225. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2226 (citing Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79).
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tee protected both state and federal witnesses against incrimination
under both state and federal law.2 26 The Court asserted that Murphy
was based on two alternative rationales but rejected one as "fatally
flawed." 227
(1) Rationale in Light of Malloy v. Hogan
The first rationale was that Murphy depended on the decision of
Malloy v. Hogan,228 decided on the same day as Murphy.229 Because
the Balsys Court found this rationale valid, it upheld Murphy. Malloy
applied the Fourteenth Amendment's due process incorporation prin-
ciple to extend the protections of the self-incrimination privilege, so
that the states as well as the federal government were bound to the
same Fifth Amendment guarantee. 230 Malloy thereby guaranteed that
the protections afforded on the federal level-"the right of a person to
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of
his own will, and to suffer no penalty"-were also secured against
state invasion.23' The Murphy Court found that Malloy "necessi-
tate[d] a reconsideration" of the Murdock rule232 since more than one
jurisdiction was now subject to the self-incrimination privilege.233 Af-
ter Murphy, a witness could no longer be "whipsawed into incriminat-
ing himself under both state and federal law even though the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to
each. '234 The Court also noted that the government had an option to
exchange the self-incrimination privilege for an equally broad grant of
immunity against using any of the compelled testimony. 235 Based on
this principle, Murphy held that unless the federal government pro-
vided federal immunity for testimony compelled by a state at least as
broad as the privilege allowed, the federal government would be pro-
hibited from making use of the compelled testimony and its fruits.236
226. Id. (citing Murphy, 378 U.S. at 77-78).
227. Id. at 2226-30.
228. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
229. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2226.
230. Id. at 2226-27.
231. Id. at 2227 (citing Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8),
232. Id. (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 57 (1964)).
233. Id.
234. Id. (quoting Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55). The Court explained that the whipsaw effect "was
possible owing to a feature unique to the guarantee against self-incrimination among the several
Fifth Amendment privileges." Id. That is, the privilege allows the government to compel a
witness to testify, as long as it grants immunity against the use of the incriminating testimony.
Id.
235. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2227 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448-49 (1972)).
236. Id. This decision of Murphy was necessary, in order to protect the witness from being
"whipsawed into incriminating himself under both state and federal law even though the consti-
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The Court concluded that Malloy showed that Murphy and Mur-
dock, despite their different results, shared the same understanding of
the clause against self-incrimination. 37 The Court explained that af-
ter Murphy, the immunity option would be viable only if the state and
federal jurisdictions acted as one, whereby a "federally mandated ex-
clusionary rule fill[ed] the space between the limits of state immunity
statutes and the scope of the privilege. 2 38 When Murphy's principles
are understood in light of their relation to Murdock, Balsys' claim and
the Murphy decision could not be reconciled.2 39
(2) Rationale According to English Common Law
The Court found flaws in the second rationale, which allowed for a
more expansive reading based on Murphy's interpretation of English
common law understanding of the privilege.2 40 The Court described
Murphy, which rejected the Murdock analysis, as "[h]aving removed
what it saw as an unjustified, historically derived limitation on the
privilege, [it instead] expressed a comparatively ambitious conceptual-
ization of personal privacy underlying the Clause .... "241 The Court
traced Murphy's rationale first by examining its use of two pre-consti-
tutional English cases, East India Co. v. Campbell 42 and Brownsword
v. Edwards243 as support of its position that Murdock's interpretation
of precedent was erroneous. 244 This Court, however, refused to adopt
Murphy's interpretation of these cases, noting that the jurisdiction in
which the witness feared prosecution was "subject to the same legisla-
tive sovereignty that had created the courts in which the privilege was
tutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to each." Id. (citing Murphy, 378 U.S.
at 55).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 2228.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 2224.
241. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2228.
242. 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex. 1749). In this case, the Court of the Exchequer extended the
privilege to the defendant based on the potential that he could be prosecuted in an English
colony, Calcutta. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2228 (citing East India Co., 27 Eng. Rep. at 1011). It
stated that it would "not oblige one to discover that, which, if he answers in the affirmative, will
subject him to the punishment of a crime." Id. (quoting East India Co., 27 Eng. Rep. at 1011);
see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
243. 28 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1750). In response to the witness invoking the privilege in the
Court of Chancery on the ground that her testimony might subject her to prosecution in the
Ecclesiastical court, the court stated that the general rule "is that no one is bound to answer so as
to subject himself to punishment, whether that punishment arises by the ecclesiastical law of the
land." Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2228 (quoting Brownsword, 28 Eng. Rep. at 158); see supra notes 38-
41 and accompanying text.
244. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2228.
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claimed. '2 45 It also noted that English courts were silent regarding
the application of the privilege against self-incrimination to foreign
prosecutions even after the adoption of the Fifth Amendment. 46
Next Murphy recognized that Murdock erred by invoking King of
the Two Sicilies2 47 for the proposition that it supported "this Court's
prior view of English law."12 48 In King of the Two Sicilies, the court
denied the privilege based first on the belief that "the privilege speaks
only to matters that might be criminal under the laws of England" and
on the "unlikelihood that the defendants would ever leave England
and be subject to Sicilian prosecution." 249 This rule in Murdock was
undermined by a subsequent English case, United States v. McRae,250
in which the court allowed the witness in England, who feared incrimi-
nation under the law of the United States, to invoke the privilege. 251
Murphy thus interpreted McRae as overruling King of the Two Sici-
lies,2 52 which accounts for its broader interpretation of the privilege.
The Balsys Court rejected Murphy's interpretation of English com-
mon-law history. It acknowledged that McRae, while perhaps cor-
rectly decided in the given circumstances, did not support the general
rule that the privilege applied whenever a witness feared foreign pros-
ecution by a party not then before the court.2 53 In addition, it found
that Murphy's holding that McRae overruled King of the Two Sicilies
was too broad.2 54 Moreover, the Court noted that even if Murphy's
holding had been correct, it would not have been relevant to the Fifth
Amendment discussion. This is because the framer's intent in apply-
ing post-constitutional English cases was uncertain, and McRae as-
245. Id. at 2228-29.
246. Id. at 2229. The Court quoted King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 61 Eng. Rep. 11 6, 128
(Ch. 1851), which noted that there is an "absence of all authority on the point," in an opinion
rejecting the witnesses' claim of privilege based on fear of foreign prosecution. Id. It is impor-
tant to point out, however, that the opinion, in fact, rejected the witnesses' claim of privilege
based on the fact that (a) it was impossible for a court to know, as a matter of law, what cases
would subject the witnesses to prosecution by a foreign sovereign, and (b) for the witnesses to be
prosecuted by the foreign sovereign, they would need to willfully bring themselves within the
jurisdiction of that sovereign. Id. Thus, any lack of authority on the privilege's application in
this situation is not the reasoning for this decision. Rather the rationale is based on the court not
wanting to speculate as to other countries' laws and as to the acts of the witnesses.
247. 61 Eng. Rep. 116.
248. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2229.
249. Id. (citing King of the Two Sicilies, 61 Eng. Rep. at 128); see supra notes 47-50 and accom-
panying text.
250. 3 L.R.-Ch. 79 (1867).
251. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2229 (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S.
52, 61 (1964)).
252. See id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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serted no clear disagreement with King of the Two Sicilies.255 For
these reasons, Murphy did not rely on any clear authority when it
overruled the historical analysis of Murdock.2 56 The Court summa-
rized its response to Murphy by asserting that to the extent that its
holding "went beyond its response to Malloy and undercut Murdock's
rationale on historical grounds, its reasoning cannot be accepted
now.... Murphy's history was shown to be fatally flawed. 2 57
c. Disagreements with Dissent
The majority disagreed with the dissenting Justices on three points.
First, it reasserted its position that the scope of the privilege against
self-incrimination must be limited to its context, and must not be ex-
panded according to its "facial breadth," as the dissent would hold.258
Second, it found that precedent, particularly Murdock, supported the
same-sovereign principle. According to the majority, the dissent
placed less weight on Murdock and more on the language of Saline
Bank.2 59 Finally, the majority disagreed with the dissent's reliance on
Murphy's historical analysis, asserting that Murdock's interpretation
of precedent as correct. 260
3. Policy Rationales of the Privilege
The Court next discussed the policy rationales of the privilege
against self-incrimination, focusing on the catalog of policies listed in
Murphy.261 Ultimately, it found that the policies did not support ex-
tending the privilege beyond its application to domestic prosecutions.
According to the Court, an extension of the privilege was unwar-
ranted based on the "highly general statements of policy" from
Murphy.262
a. Limited Personal Right Policy
The first policy the Court examined, which Balsys offered as a justi-
fication for extending the privilege to cases involving fear of foreign
prosecution, was that he had the right to protection based on "the
inviolability of the human personality and ... the right of each indi-
255. Id. at 2230.
256. Id.
257. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2230.
258. Id. at 2231.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See supra notes 86-107 and accompanying text (describing the two categories of ratio-
nales historically accepted as justification for the Self-Incrimination Clause).
262. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2231.
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vidual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. ' 263 The
Court rejected this personal right as a policy because accepting it
would require the Court to believe that individuals have an unfettered
right to be protected from any governmental intrusion through "invol-
untary interrogation. 2 64 The Fifth Amendment does not actually ex-
tend such protection where the government provides immunity as
broad as the protections granted by the Fifth Amendment, although it
can compel self-incriminating testimony without any recognition of
personal violation.2 65 The actual protection afforded is "a conditional
protection of testimonial privacy. ' 266 To extend the protection Balsys
sought would "threaten a significant change in the scope of traditional
domestic protection. '267
b. Flawed Analogy between "Cooperative Federalism" and
"Cooperative Internationalism"
The second general policy the Court addressed was that the privi-
lege was necessary to protect individuals from governmental over-
reaching. 268 The Court stated that Balsys' premise rested on the idea
of "cooperative internationalism," specifically that governments were
cooperating in criminal prosecutions today more than ever.2 69 This, in
turn, created an incentive for the United States government to over-
reach its power since it has a "significant interest in seeing individuals
convicted abroad for their crimes. ' 270 Balsys' argument invoked rea-
soning from Murphy, which discussed "cooperative federalism,"
through which federal and state officials cooperate in criminal prose-
cutions. 271 The Court found that Murphy's idea of "cooperative fed-
eralism" makes sense only in light of Malloy, which requires that both
states and the federal government be subject to the Fifth Amend-
ment.272 Under these circumstances, it would have been "unjustifi-
ably formalistic for a federal court to ignore fear of state prosecution
when ruling on a privilege claim," especially where the states and fed-
263. Id. at 2232 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 61
(1964)).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2233.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. (citing Murphy, v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 56 (1964)).
272. Id. The Court essentially noted that protection against the "whipsaw effect" results from
the application of the privilege to state prosecutions, which is especially necessary during this age
of "cooperative federalism." Id. (quoting Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55-56).
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eral government commonly work together to fight criminal activity,
such that a witness would be particularly susceptible to the "whipsaw"
effect.273
Because the Fifth Amendment only extends to the United States
borders, Balsys' appeal to "cooperative internationalism" based on
analogy to Murphy's "cooperative federalism" is misplaced.274 The
Court commented that even if Murphy provided sufficient authority
for adopting this analogy, extension of the privilege would still depend
on an analysis of the gains and losses of extending the privilege, in
which case, Balsys would still fail because he did not show that ex-
tending him the protection would produce a justifiable benefit. 275 The
Court reviewed the court of appeals' discussion of this evaluation. 276
Of significance to the majority, the court of appeals noted that the
United States could "limit the occasions on which a reasonable fear of
foreign prosecution could be shown" through statute and treaty modi-
fications.277 In response, the Court noted that it did not want to prem-
ise a finding on the assumption that the federal government, which
constitutionally has discretion over foreign relations,27 8 would adopt
certain policies in order to achieve the goals of the Court.279 Sec-
ondly, the court of appeals noted that a witness' refusal to testify
could be used as evidence in a civil proceeding, such as deportation.
Thus, extending the privilege as Balsys wanted would not necessarily
be a cost to the United States government.280 The Court questioned
whether the assumption about a witness' silence would allow the privi-
273. Id.
274. To interpret the majority's reasoning: Because the Fifth Amendment reaches only to the
United States borders and not beyond, no foreign sovereign is bound by the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination. Consequently, a witness cannot be whipsawed into revealing
self-incriminating information in one jurisdiction while being subjected to prosecution in an-
other, because the whipsaw rationale only applies to jurisdictions bound by the privilege. Be-
cause foreign sovereigns are not so bound, the whipsaw argument is irrelevant, despite any
cooperation among such sovereigns.
275. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2234.
276. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which concluded that an extension of the
privilege was justified on the fact that any costs for doing so were negligible, examined four
elements that this majority discussed on which to evaluate gains and losses. Id. The Court of
Appeals concluded that domestic proceedings would be little affected by expansion; that wit-
nesses fearing foreign prosecution might be likely to choose contempt sanctions over facing con-
sequences of foreign prosecution; that the Executive branch could take measures to limit the
circumstances under which reasonable fear of foreign prosecution would be acknowledged; and
that refusal to testify may be used as evidence in a civil deportation proceeding. Id; see United
States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 135-39, 142 (2d Cir. 1997).
277. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2234.
278. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
279. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2234.
280. Id.
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lege to be of any benefit to the witness.2 81 The Court concluded that
in the event the privilege were extended, the loss of testimony to the
United States was of greater concern than the uncertain gain to the
witness who feared foreign prosecution.
282
4. Circumstances Required for Extension of Privilege for Fear of
Foreign Prosecution
The court left open a small possibility that a time may come when
the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination may ex-
tend to fear of foreign prosecution under certain conditions.28 3 In es-
sence, the prosecution feared must be "as much on behalf of the
United States as on the prosecuting nation, so that the division of la-
bor between evidence gatherer and prosecutor made one nation the
agent of the other. '2 84 The Court, however, held that those conditions
did not exist in Balsys' case; any interest in prosecution between the
United States government and the governments of Lithuania and
Israel, "does not rise to the level of cooperative prosecution. 2 85
D. The Concurrence
Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize certain
points. He reiterated that the self-incrimination clause must be read
in context of all Fifth Amendment guarantees.2 86 He noted that the
main purpose of the Fifth Amendment clause at issue is to "afford
protection to persons whose liberty has been placed in jeopardy in an
American tribunal. 2 87 In addition, he stated his belief that the Bill of
Rights was not intended to have any effect on conduct abroad.2 88 To
give a clause of the Bill of Rights effect beyond United States borders
would instill foreign governments with a degree of power over the
domestic administration of justice, which would be to the detriment of
the United States.289
281. Id.
282. Id. at 2235.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2236.
286. Id.
287. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
288. Id.
289. Id. Justice Stevens offered an example that a foreign citizen could thwart domestic law
enforcement if that individual's own country enacted a law making it a crime for that citizen to
testify in an American proceeding against another citizen of that country. Id.
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E. Justice Ginsburg's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsburg's dissent focused on the historical bases of the
privilege, which was "linked . . .with the abolition of torture" and
which served as a means to "make [man] civilized. ' 290 As she stated,
"the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prescribes
a rule of conduct generally to be followed by our Nation's official-
dom. '291 United States interrogators should respect this clause, re-
gardless of where the feared prosecution resides.
F. Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, also dissented. He fo-
cused on the precedent of Murphy as well as the principles underlying
the Fifth Amendment privilege to conclude that the phrase "any crim-
inal case" encompasses protection based on the fear of foreign
prosecutions. 292
1. Language of the Fifth Amendment and an Understanding of
Precedent
Justice Breyer began by noting the majority's departure from prece-
dent in light of the scope of the word "any." Murphy, he contended,
laid out the current and appropriate understanding of that word.293
Murphy stands for the proposition that courts, both federal and state,
are prohibited from compelling witnesses to provide evidence that
may be used against them if they reasonably fear criminal prosecu-
tion.294 This understanding requires the abolition of the "same-sover-
eign rule. '295 Murphy directs that if testimony may incriminate and
no immunity has been granted, then the privilege must apply "across
jurisdictions," to either state or federal prosecutions. 296 Understood
in this way, the only difference between Murphy and Balsys is that the
reasonableness of a threat of prosecution abroad may also be ques-
tioned. Justice Breyer contended that Murphy's understanding of the
privilege applied when fear of prosecution abroad was reasonable. 297
Justice Breyer first attacked the majority's view that Murphy rested
on the same-sovereign principle that Murdock recognized. Specifi-
290. Id. (quoting GRISWOLD, supra note 21, at 7).
291. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2236.
292. Id. at 2237 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 2237-38.
296. Id. at 2238.
297. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2238.
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cally, the majority saw Murphy as standing for the principle "that the
courts of a government from which a witness may reasonably fear
prosecution may not in fairness compel the witness to furnish testimo-
nial evidence that may be used to prove his guilt. '298 Justice Breyer
underscored the words "from which," believing that through these
words, the majority misinterpreted Murphy, which in fact stands for
the principle that "courts may not in fairness compel a witness who
reasonably fears prosecution to furnish testimony that my be used to
prove his guilt. 12 99
Justice Breyer noted the majority's reliance on two statements from
Murphy: first, that Malloy required a reconsideration of Murdock, and
second, that most Fifth Amendment policies are defeated through the
"whipsaw effect," which can result when the protection does not span
state and federal jurisdictions.3°° According to Justice Breyer, these
two statements provided little evidence that a reinterpretation of Mur-
phy was necessary.301 Justice Breyer then provided what he believed
was a more plausible rationale of Murphy, which rejected Murdock's
"same-sovereign" rule based upon the nature and history of the un-
derlying right.302 Thus, Murphy requires the privilege to protect a wit-
ness from being compelled to testify when that testimony could be
used in a subsequent criminal prosecution by another sovereign.
Justice Breyer disagreed with the majority's conclusion that Mur-
phy's reasoning was "fatally flawed," and "legally unsound." Murphy
noted that Malloy called for a reconsideration of Murdock, but Mur-
phy rejected the same-sovereign rule based on history and purposes of
the privilege.30 3 Justice Breyer believed that Murphy rationalized
overturning Murdock better than the majority rationalized overturn-
ing Murphy.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. Justice Breyer cited six reasons why Murphy supports his interpretation of that case
as against the majority's: (1) Murphy did not depend on the principles of federalism; (2) it explic-
itly rejected Murdock, not because of federalism concerns but because of history, policies and
purposes of the privilege; (3) Murphy devoted much of the opinion to examining the privilege as
understood in both English and American courts prior to Murdock, neither of which subscribed
to the same-sovereign rule; (4) the purposes of the privilege do not support the same-sovereign
rule; (5) Murphy rejected commentators arguing for the Murdock rule because they had an in-
complete understanding of the privilege's purposes; and (6) Murphy nowhere suggested that the
privilege was premised on anything other than not being limited to the same-jurisdiction rule.
Id. at 2238-39.
303. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2239.
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Justice Breyer asserted that English law did not embody a "same-
sovereign" rule. 30 4 Rather, the actual English rule was that the privi-
lege was inapplicable only if the danger of prosecution by another sov-
ereign was "speculative or insubstantial. ' 30 5 Secondly, Justice Breyer
asserted that American cases prior to Murdock did not require a
"same sovereign" rule. Rather, the rule as set forth in Saline Bank, is
that "a party is not bound to make any discovery which would expose
him to penalties. ' 30 6 Even dicta, which appeared to narrow the appli-
cation of the privilege to the same jurisdiction as that seeking discov-
ery,307 was attributed to a "misunderstood" English rule.30 8
Justice Breyer stressed that the majority made no clear showing that
the historical interpretations which Murphy made were wrong.309 Un-
certainty surrounding early applications of the privilege was an insuffi-
cient basis for abandoning one set of reasoning for another.310
Moreover, the broad language of the clause allowed for the interpre-
tation of Murphy, especially considering the lack of legislative his-
tory.311 In short, Justice Breyer concluded that Murphy should
govern.31 2
2. Fifth Amendment Policies
Justice Breyer believed that the privilege applies whenever the
threat of foreign prosecution is "real and substantial. ' 31 3 He used
four basic purposes of the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-
incrimination to support his position that Balsys is entitled to protec-
tion. First, he recognized that self-incrimination insults human dignity
by subjecting a witness to the "'cruel [choice] of self-accusation, per-
304. Id.
305. Id. at 2240. Justice Breyer noted that in neither the English case East India Co. v. Camp-
bell, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex. 1749), nor Brownsword v. Edwards, 28 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1750),
did the court mention a single sovereign principle. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2239. Moreover, in King
of the Two Sicilies, on which Murdock relied for the same sovereign rule, did not in fact stand for
that rule, since the reason that court's rationale was based on the likelihood that the witnesses
would actually be prosecuted by the foreign sovereign. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2240; see supra notes
47-50 and accompanying text.
306. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2240 (quoting United States v. Saline Bank of Va., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
100, 104 (1828)).
307. Id. (citing Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372, 382 (1905) for unexplained dicta, on which Hale
v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 68-69 (1906) erroneously relied).
308. Id. Justice Breyer observed that immediately prior to Murdock, the question of the same
sovereign rule had yet to be decided. Id. (citing Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273
U.S 103 (1927)).
309. Id. at 2241.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2241.
313. Id. at 2242.
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jury or contempt." 314 Next, he observed the importance of personal
privacy that is preserved by the self-incrimination clause.315 Third, he
noted that the privilege guards against governmental overreaching,
which is a danger as much when the feared prosecution is by another
sovereign as when it is domestic. 316 Balsys' analogy regarding "coop-
erative internationalism" to Murphy's rationale of "cooperative feder-
alism" was powerful, particularly since the degree of international
cooperation in criminal investigations had greatly increased since
Murphy.317 The United States had a significant stake in Balsys and
others like him being prosecuted; therefore, those witnesses needed
the Fifth Amendment's privilege in order to prevent the federal gov-
ernment from overreaching its authority. 318 Justice Breyer also ex-
plained that the privilege against self-incrimination reflected the
American government's preference for an accusatorial over an inquis-
itorial system.319 The American criminal justice system grant's protec-
tion both during investigations and the trial phase. 320 In Balsys' case,
the criminal investigation would be built in the United States, yet
prosecuted in another country. 32' Thus, denying Balsys' Fifth Amend-
ment protection would be a denial of a constitutional right, whether or
not the Bill of Rights was meant to impact foreign cases.322
Justice Breyer then responded to the two potential reasons that the
majority did not act in accordance with the purposes of the Fifth
Amendment privilege. First, he addressed a reason premised on fair-
ness, rejecting as determinative any suggestion that the compulsion
and use by the same sovereign is less fair than compulsion by one
government and use by another.323 He reasoned that fairness is
merely a matter of degree; international cooperation today is possibly
as great as was cooperation between the federal government and
states or among the states fifty years ago. 324 Concern with "inherent
314. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990)).
315. Id. He stressed the fact that the privilege "discourag[es] prosecution for crimes of
thought," such as where witnesses in English history were forced to reveal incriminating
thoughts or else commit perjury. Id. (quoting Muniz, 496 U.S. at 595-96). While such a concern
is not as important when we have protection of thoughts under the First Amendment, such a fact
does not sufficiently justify failing to extend protection for foreign prosecutions. Id.
316. Id. at 2243.
317. Id.
318. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2243.
319. Id. (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
320. Id. at 2244 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Justice Breyer, with this argument, seems to analogize the relationship of the United
States to other countries with that of the federal government to the states. He noted that where
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indignity and cruelty to the individual" in self-incriminatory compul-
sion are more of a concern than is fairness. 325
Second, Justice Breyer posited that fear of extending the privilege
when a witness is in danger of foreign prosecution would interfere
unreasonably with law enforcement efforts is "overstated. '326 The ap-
plication of this privilege would not arise too often because the wit-
ness has a high burden of showing a "real and substantial fear" of
foreign prosecution. 327 Even with such a showing, the witness is not
entitled to be generally silent; rather, the witness may only claim pro-
tection against compelled testimony relating to the potential foreign
prosecution. 328 Occasionally, the government may determine that the
testimony is necessary. In these cases, it may offer "de facto 'immu-
nity,"' such as a promise that the United States would not deport the
witness or that it would not deport him or her to the country in which
prosecution is feared.329 While Justice Breyer recognized potential
difficulties in providing such "immunity," he asserted that it would not
create any greater obstacles than those that accompany ordinary
immunity.330
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has finally provided some much-needed gui-
dance to lower courts on this issue. In Balsys, the United States gov-
ernment has attempted to compel the defendant to provide self-
incriminating information in a domestic civil deportation proceeding.
His refusal to cooperate rested on his belief that because of his real
and substantial fear of criminal prosecution by a foreign sovereign, he
could not be compelled to provide self-incriminating testimony. This
compulsion by one government overlaps with use by another sovereign, such that if the fairness
argument is pursued and the idea of "cooperative internationalism" is forwarded, the compelling
government and the using government are not far removed from one another. Balsys, 118 S. Ct.
at 2244. In such a situation, it seems that the extension of the privilege against self-incrimination
is warranted.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. (citing Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972) for
the controlling test of "real and substantial fear").
328. Id. at 2244-45. Justice Breyer also noted that in a civil proceeding, the government may
draw an adverse inference from the witness' silence and may also support that inference with
evidence from non-privileged sources. Id.
329. Id. at 2245.
330. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2245. Some problems he noted that the government might encoun-
ter are that domestic law might need a change or an agreement with a foreign government might
require adjustment. Id. The worst scenario he foresaw would be that more "potentially deport-
able" aliens remain in the United States, much like ordinary immunity allows certain citizens to
remain free, where they would otherwise be sent to prison. Id.
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Part will demonstrate that Balsys' proposition has the force of the lan-
guage and the history of the Constitution behind it. It next will argue
that the "settled rule of England," on which both Balsys and Murdock
relied, is unclear. Therefore, these cases do not persuasively support
the Supreme Court's holding. Instead these English cases support the
Second Circuit's rationale for extending to privilege to Balsys. It fol-
lows that the Supreme Court erred in its decision not to extend the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to Balsys.
A. The Scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause is Not Limited to the
Context of the Fifth Amendment
Any analysis of the scope the Fifth Amendment clause protecting
against self-incrimination must begin with an examination of the lan-
guage of the clause itself. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."' 331 The majority in Balsys asserted that this clause
can be read only within the context of the rest of the Fifth Amend-
ment, and that to interpret its meaning otherwise is to "overlook[ ] the
cardinal rule to construe provisions in context. ' 332 This contextual
rule, the Court posited, requires an interpretation that the privilege in
question applies only when the witness fears prosecution from a juris-
diction limited by the Fifth Amendment Clause. According to the ma-
jority's argument, since foreign jurisdictions are not bound by the
United States Constitution, a witness cannot invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination against a foreign sovereign. As this discus-
sion will demonstrate, a reading of "any criminal case" does not re-
quire an analysis based on its context within the other Fifth
Amendment clauses. Rather, a proper interpretation requires an
analysis based on the historical context of the privilege and the poli-
cies that support it.
331. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 2.
332. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2223 (citing King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991)).
The majority explained that:
In the Fifth Amendment context, the Clause in question occurs in the company of guar-
antees of grand jury proceedings, defense against double jeopardy, due process, and
compensation for property taking. Because none of these provisions is implicated ex-
cept by action of the government that it binds, it would have been strange to choose
such associates for a Clause meant to take a broader view, and it would be strange to
find such a sweep in the Clause now.
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1. Historical Roots of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Part I of this Note discussed the history of the Fifth Amendment's
self-incrimination clause and explained that the framers provided fu-
ture generations with few records from which they could glean what
the amendment's scope should be.333 This has led to conflicting inter-
pretations. The majority in Balsys acknowledged this, admitting that
there was no legislative history about the framers' intent. Based in
part on a lack of such information, the Court concluded that the
clause must be read in context.334 The absence of such history, how-
ever, seems to require looking beyond the context of the clause to
determine precisely why the framers included it. The Court was un-
convincing when it stated that a contextual reading was required be-
cause it offered no rationale other than the sparse legislative history
and that no different common law practice existed at the time.335 Ex-
tensive evaluations of the history behind the self-incrimination clause
have been completed, and while none provide a definitive look into
the minds of the framers, neither do they indicate that the clause must
be read within the context of the rest of the Fifth Amendment. It
would do the clause a disservice to force it into such a context given
the amount of attribution scholars have paid this issue.
The Court indicated that only a few early cases addressed the prob-
lem of a witness in one jurisdiction fearing prosecution in another ju-
risdiction before Malloy extended the right equally to the states and
federal government. This is because in cases such as Brown v.
Walker,336 Jack v. Kansas,337 and Hale v. Henkel,338 the witnesses who
invoked the privilege were denied it either because of an immunity
statute or because their fears of prosecution by the other jurisdiction
were unreasonable. 339 The Court presented those three cases as sup-
333. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
334. See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2223.
335. Id.
336. 161 U.S. 591 (1896) (holding that a federal witness could not invoke the privilege based
on fear of state prosecution because a grant of immunity under a federal immunity statute pro-
tected him from state prosecution).
337. 199 U.S. 372 (1905) (affirming a sentence for contempt where the witness, while having
been granted immunity from state prosecution, refused to testify in a state proceeding based on
fear of federal prosecution, despite the fact that the witness's fear of federal prosecution was
unreasonable).
338. 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (refusing to extend the privilege to a federal witness, who had been
granted immunity from federal prosecution, based on the "general proposition that 'the possibil-
ity that information given by the witness might be used' by the other government is, as a matter
of law, 'a danger so unsubstantial and remote' that it fails to trigger the right to invoke the
privilege").
339. See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2224.
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port for the proposition that the Murdock rule must prevail. From
Hale, for example, the Court used dicta, which said that "[t]he ques-
tion has been fully considered in England, and the conclusion reached
by the courts ... [is] that the only danger to be considered is one
arising within the same jurisdiction and under the same sover-
eignty. ' 340 Such a statement is unpersuasive precedent for urging the
adoption of the same jurisdiction rule because it addressed an issue
beyond the scope of the question then before the Court. Based on
these cases, however, the Court in United States v. Murdock341 claimed
that the issue was "definitely settled. '342 Thus, Balsys concluded that
it had to reaffirm Murdock's same-jurisdiction rule.343
Conversely, the Court in Murphy unequivocally found that the
same-sovereign rule was no longer good law. 344 The Murphy Court
acknowledged that Malloy required a reexamination of the same sov-
ereign rule; however, it only did so while simultaneously examining
earlier Supreme Court cases345 and English common law. 346 If Mur-
340. Id. (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69 (1906)).
341. 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
342. Id. at 149 (citing for support Queen v. Boyes, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (Q.B. 1861) and King of
the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch. 1851)).
343. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2230-31.
344. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 57 (1964) (finding that
"[o]ur review of the pertinent cases in this Court and of their English antecedents reveals that
Murdock did not adequately consider the relevant authorities and has been significantly weak-
ened by subsequent decisions of this Court").
345. Murphy found support in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S.
372 (1905); and Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906). While Murdock found Hale v. Henkel to
have overturned Ballmann, Murphy asserted that "the critical constitutional issue-whether the
Fifth Amendment protects a federal witness from incriminating himself under state law-was
not briefed or argued in Hale v. Henkel." Murphy, 378 U.S. at 66. Moreover, Murphy claimed,
Hale could have rightly been decided on authority of Brown. Id.
346. The Court cited East India Co. v. Campbell, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex. 1749) and Brown-
sword v. Edwards, 28 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1750) for the proposition that an English common law
court cannot compel testimony from a witness who might provide incriminating testimony in
another jurisdiction, whether it be in a foreign country or in an ecclesiastical court. See Murphy,
378 U.S. at 58-59. The Court cited United States v. Saline Bank for the proposition that the self-
incrimination privilege applies across jurisdictions. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 59-60. Finally, it noted
that United States v. McRae, 3 Ch. App. 79 (1867) explicitly overruled an English case on which
Murdock relied, King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, a case that Murphy denied as representing
the settled English rule. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 61. While King of the Two Sicilies and McRae are
both post-constitutional English cases, whose persuasive value is thus questionable, the fact that
Murdock relied on the former in rendering its opinion gives weight to the latter. In King of the
Two Sicilies, the holding, which rejected an extension of the privilege to a witness fearing foreign
prosecution, did not decide the constitutional question since it was questionable whether the
witnesses in fact would have been criminally prosecuted based on their testimony. See United
States v. McRae, 3 L.R.-Ch. App. 79, 87 (1867). McRae, however, held that the case before it,
where a defendant, sued by the United States in an English court and refused to testify because
he could subject himself to penalties in the United States, could not be distinguished "in princi-
ple from one where a witness is protected from answering any question which has a tendency to
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phy was premised solely on extending the Fifth Amendment privilege
to the states, the opinion would have been very short. Instead, the
Murphy Court considered the history and policies of the privilege at
great length. While the length of an opinion is not dispositive of its
findings, this demonstrates an acceptance of precedent, which further
indicates that the Malloy holding did not dictate the conclusion in
Murphy. The majority's conclusion that Murphy necessarily requires
a reaffirmation of the same-jurisdiction rule is not well-explained.
The majority reasoned that under Murphy, a witness who asserts the
privilege against self-incrimination is protected in both state and fed-
eral proceedings, whether the protection is granted through the privi-
lege itself or by reason of immunity and the exclusionary rule. Based
on this reasoning, the court concluded that because the effect of the
same-jurisdiction rule is the same, the state and federal jurisdictions
are treated as one, and thus that Murphy did not in fact reject the
same-jurisdiction rule.
This reasoning is incomplete. While the lines between federal and
state jurisdictions may have become blurred in the years since Mur-
phy, they have not disappeared. Under a same-jurisdiction point of
view, the sovereign compelling the testimony and the sovereign using
the testimony are the same. The United States federal structure, how-
ever, has not been eliminated. Despite the fact that the Fifth Amend-
ment applies to both jurisdictions, Murphy still allows the testimony to
be compelled in one jurisdiction and used in another. For instance, if
one jurisdiction compels testimony without a grant of immunity, the
other jurisdiction would not be precluded from using that
testimony. 347
As stated above, the majority concluded that the same-jurisdiction
rule must apply, in part because "there was no different common law
practice at that time." However, this conclusion is based on one inter-
pretation of precedent that is questionable. The fact that Murphy in-
terpreted the common law practice one way, and the Balsys Court
interpreted it another way, does not conclusively establish that there
was no other practice at common law. Rather, it merely demonstrates
expose him to forfeiture for a breach of our own municipal law." Id. It is interesting to note that
Murdock did not mention this latter case in its opinion.
347. The dissent in Balsys noted that:
[w]here testimony may incriminate and immunity has not been granted, it is so reason-
able, that one can say, as a matter of law, that the privilege applies across jurisdictions,
to the entire class of cases involving federal witnesses who fear state prosecutions and
also to the entire class of cases involving state witnesses who fear federal prosecutions.
Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2238 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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disagreement over common law. The majority's conclusive statement
does not enhance its credibility in the face of such disagreement.
348
B. Policy Rationales for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The Court in Balsys also questioned the policies behind the privi-
lege. 349 As discussed in Part I, the privilege against self-incrimination
reflects two rationales: first, promoting individual dignity and privacy,
and second, protecting against governmental overreaching. 350 Justice
Goldberg, author of the Murphy opinion, provided a comprehensive
catalog of the policies behind the privilege, based on case law and
scholarly works. 351 While the Balsys majority cautioned against rely-
ing too heavily on this list, the policies it outlined are commonly re-
garded as the purpose for the Fifth Amendment privilege.
1. Rights Personal to the Individual
The Balsys Court first suggested that the privilege against self-in-
crimination was not intended to protect rights of the individual to the
degree that Balsys asserted. 352 The Court's treatment of this issue,
however, is quite cursory. The Supreme Court has asserted that the
Fifth Amendment privilege encompasses a variety of rights, as Mur-
phy indicated. Of the entire list of policy rationales in Murphy, the
Court chose to give particular weight to one-the notion that protec-
tion arises from "the inviolability of the human personality and.., the
right of each individual to a private enclave where he may lead a pri-
vate life."'353
According to the Court, this policy suggests that the government
has no right to tread on an individual's privacy. The Court pointed
out that this is simply not true.354 Even under Murphy, the govern-
ment can'compel a person to testify, provided it grants the individual
immunity. What this policy stands for is that "the freedom from un-
348. Not only has there been disagreement in the Supreme Court at various times in its his-
tory, but scholars and commentators have also disagreed about the implications of the precedent
cited. See, e.g., Amann, supra note 55, at 1215 (discussing Murphy abolishing the same-sovereign
rule); Rotsztain, supra note 58, at 1949-50 (discussing the uncertainty of English law and which
cases represent the "English rule"). ,
349. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2231 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378
U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
350. See Araneta, 794 F.2d 920, 926 (4th Cir. 1986) ("The privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination serves a dual purpose. It protects individual dignity and conscience, and it pre-
serves the accusatorial nature Pf our system of justice.").
351. See supra note 79.
352. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2232.
353. Id. (quoting Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55).
354. Id.
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conscionable invasions of privacy and the freedom from convictions
based upon coerced confessions do enjoy an 'intimate relation' in
their perpetuation of 'principles of humanity and civil liberty (se-
cured) ... only after years of struggle."355
By discounting the privilege as an individual right, the Balsys Court
distorts what the Murphy Court attempted to accomplish by listing a
catalog of policies. The list of policies should serve as a basis to in-
struct courts as to the scope of the privilege rather than as an absolute
restriction on the government's actions. For example, the policy of
protection of the individual based on the inviolability of the human
personality is a value to which the government should aspire and
which it should not unnecessarily violate. Compelling testimony with
a grant of immunity seems to satisfy the government's needs of attain-
ing certain information, while simultaneously protecting the individ-
ual's privacy by allowing him or her to avoid sanctions based on that
testimony.
2. Prevention Against Governmental Overreaching
The Court admitted that the second general purpose of the privi-
lege-to prevent governmental overreaching-would better justify an
extension of the privilege against self-incrimination to cases involving
fear of foreign prosecution.356 One of Balsys' contentions was that a
"cooperative internationalism," similar to Murphy's "cooperative fed-
eralism" has developed whereby the United States government has an
incentive to facilitate criminal prosecutions abroad.3 57 The Court re-
jected this assertion, indicating that this analogy overstates Murphy's
reliance on cooperative federalism. 358 Even if this analogy were plau-
sible, extending the privilege still is not warranted because while the
witness might gain in the United States from her silence, she could still
be prosecuted for her silence in a foreign jurisdiction that does not
recognize such a privilege. The majority weighed the likely benefits to
the witness against the losses to the United States and found that ex-
tending the privilege would thwart domestic law enforcement. 359
The Court should not be balancing inherent constitutional rights
against any consequence to the government.360 These rights should
355. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57
(1961)).
356. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2233.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 2235.
360. Some cases have permitted balancing government interests against constitutional rights.
See Araneta, 794 F.2d 920, 926 (4th Cir. 1986) ("[O]ur own national sovereignty would be com-
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only be limited based on legislative action amending the Constitution.
Any discussion of the consequences of extending the Fifth Amend-
ment right to cases involving fear of foreign prosecution should hap-
pen only after it has been determined that the constitutional right
exists. Such discussion ought not serve as a basis for denying the
privilege.
A discussion of what the United States would lose by extending the
privilege is unwarranted too because even domestically, any time the
courts or the government grants the Fifth Amendment privilege, the
government suffers consequences of not attaining testimony or other
information. The privilege in and of itself, by allowing an individual
either not to provide certain information, or to be protected from the
use of the testimony, forces the government to lose some evidence.361
The assertion that no analogy to "cooperative internationalism" is
plausible is inaccurate. In reality, Murphy's discussion of "coopera-
tive federalism" is well-placed. According to Professor Diane
Amann, when the Fourteenth Amendment was being used to extend
the guaranteed constitutional rights to the states, cooperation between
state and federal law enforcement officers was growing.362 This coop-
eration did not exist before because criminal enforcement had been
largely the province of the states.363
Similar cooperation exists at the international level. Sovereign na-
tions have become increasingly cooperative with one another. 364 Rec-
iprocity between the United States and foreign jurisdictions has
promised if our system of criminal justice were made to depend on the actions of foreign govern-
ment [sic] beyond our control."). The Court has denied a restriction on the Constitution solely
so as to act impedement to law enforcement efforts. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
479 (1966) (responding to an argument that "society's need for interrogation outweighs the privi-
lege [against self-incrimination]" and holding that an individual's constitutional rights as against
the power of the government "cannot be abridged"). See Amicus Brief for Respondent at 22,
Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218 (No. 97-873).
361. In fact, some scholars and jurists have questioned the continued viability and desirability
of this right domestically, believing that it is not necessary in order to preserve the integrity of
our criminal justice system. In particular, one critic of this right was Judge Henry Friendly, who
suggested that at one time it was a necessary tool for preserving the system's integrity, but with
changing times, it acts more as a hindrance to law enforcement efforts and prevents the trier of
fact from learning the truth of a matter. Friendly, supra note 28, at 672. He felt that the privi-
lege has been pushed to lengths beyond that supported by any rationale. Id; see R. H. Helmholz
et al., Introduction to THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 1, 2-4 (1997).
362. Amann, supra note 55, at 1218-20.
363. Id. Professor Amann noted that before such cooperation was recognized there was an
assumption that the law enforcement efforts in the states and federal government were governed
as distinct, sovereign entities. Id. Some of the cooperative efforts included federal agencies
training state police, offering forensic help, and assisting in the gathering of evidence. Id. at
1219.
364. Id. at 1245.
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increased, just as it did between the federal and state governments
when Murphy was decided. 365 For instance, the cooperative unit for
economic integration of the North America, the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), has provided for strengthening crimi-
nal protection in the fields of intellectual property, the environment,
and labor.366 This level of cooperation will likely increase in the
future.367
Arising from this international cooperation is the danger that one
state will begin acting on behalf of another, somewhat like an agent.
Judge Carnes, who dissented in United States v. Gecas, which did not
extend the privilege to fear of foreign prosecution, 368 recognized this
danger and demonstrated that the United States government has ad-
mitted to taking part in such a "cooperative" relationship. 369 Judge
Carnes pointed to a statement from the Department of Justice that
"this case [Gecas] is less about efforts to determine whether Gecas
should be deported than it is about efforts to assist foreign countries in
prosecuting him. ' 370 The United States Department of Justice, in a
brief submitted to a circuit court on a related matter, described the
active assistance the United States had provided to Israel and Lithua-
nia's criminal investigations of Gecas by sharing information and evi-
dence.371 As Judge Carnes explained, "the United States in Gecas was
clearly the alter ego of Israel and Lithuania. '372
This situation demonstrates the problem a witness can face in the
United States when he or she might face foreign prosecution. The
United States was so connected to the potentially prosecuting coun-
tries, one could argue that in addition to pursuing its own goals of
ridding this country of Nazi war criminals, it was also working on be-
half of foreign countries by helping them achieve their goals. By not
extending the privilege and by compelling the witness to testify, Gecas
faced the same "whipsaw effect" that Murphy warned against'when it
365. Id.
366. Bruce Zagaris, International Criminal and Enforcement Cooperation in the Americas in
the Wake of Integration: A Post-NAFTA Transition Period Analysis with Special Attention to In-
vesting in Mexico, 3 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 1, 2 (1996).
367. Some recent results of the enforcement cooperation include a bilateral narcotics agree-
ment; conventions on the recovery and return of stolen cultural property, stolen vehicles, and
aircraft; and the increasingly active role by Mexico in regional criminal and narcotics policy. Id.
368. United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419 (11th Cir. 1997).
369. Id.
370. Id. It should be recalled that the facts of Gecas are virtually the same as those of the
current case, Balsys, where the witness faced deportation from the United States and refused to
testify in a deportation proceeding based on his fear of prosecution in Lithuania or Israel.
371. Id.
372. Id.
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extended the privilege cross-jurisdictionally. The United States, act-
ing on behalf of another sovereign, was able to completely ignore the
constitutional rights of the witness, and ultimately to overreach its
power. This is the very reason identified by Balsys for having the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination. 373
The above lends support to the fact that the privilege against self-
incrimination should be extended in situations when the witness fears
foreign prosecution. The Court has acknowledged that certain cir-
cumstances might justify extending the privilege. As the majority
noted, if "the prosecution [by a foreign country] was as much on be-
half of the United States as of the prosecuting nation, so that the divi-
sion of labor between evidence-gather and prosecutor made one
nation the agent of the other," then it would consider extending the
privilege to witnesses in these situations because "that prosecution
was not fairly characterized as distinctly 'foreign." 374 Given the un-
deniable interest the United States has in seeing witnesses like Balsys
brought to justice, a strong argument exists that the United States has
cooperated with other nations to an extent that would render the
prosecution insufficiently "foreign."
The Balsys majority is unpersuasive in holding that the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination should not extend to wit-
nesses who potentially face foreign prosecution. It is likely that the
Court was influenced by the circumstances of this case, namely that
Balsys was suspected of horrific crimes under the Nazi regime. The
Court, however, cannot base a policy decision on the facts of a single
case.
IV. IMPACT
Balsys ahswers a question that has long plagued the courts. Unfor-
tunately, it does so by narrowing the reach of the Constitution, despite
the fact that the policies behind the privilege support its expansion to
fear against foreign prosecution. In addition, the history of the privi-
lege reveals a lack of agreement among scholars. Moreover, one can-
not ignore the fact that international relations have dramatically
changed in the past two decades, rendering the contact between the
United States and other sovereigns analogous to the contact between
the states and federal government at the time of Murphy.
373. United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 2233 (1998) ("Murphy's policy catalog would
provide support... for Balsys' argument that application of the privilege [against self-incrimina-
tion] in situations like his would promote the purpose of preventing governmental overreaching,
which on anyone's view lies at the core of the Clause's purposes.").
374. Id. at 2235.
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A. Potential Expansion of the Privilege
Despite its unequivocal denial of extending the reach of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination to cases involving the fear of foreign
prosecution, the Court acknowledged that it may be persuaded to en-
tertain this argument again under certain circumstances. Particularly,
such a claim may be allowed if:
the prosecution was as much on behalf of the United States as of the
prosecuting nation, so that the division of labor between the evi-
dence-gatherer and prosecutor made one nation the agent of the
other, rendering fear of foreign prosecution tantamount to fear of a
criminal case brought by the Government itself.375
The Court must be mindful that international cooperation has dramat-
ically increased in recent years and is not likely to diminish as crime
becomes more and more international. As sovereign nations become
increasingly cooperative in criminal prosecutions, 376 and as they come
to greater agreement about human rights,377 the extension of the priv-
ilege to fear of foreign prosecution may occur.
B. Impact of Balsys on Courts and on Witnesses
Until the Court determines that there is cooperation between the
United States and the foreign sovereigns, witnesses cannot invoke the
constitutional privilege despite a real and substantial danger of foreign
prosecution. This rule removes a burden on the courts. Prior to Bal-
sys, lower courts passed on the constitutional issue only after examin-
ing the likelihood of foreign prosecution.378 This examination often
375. Id. More specifically, the Court might entertain a claim for an extension of the privilege
under two conditions. First the witness must show that "the United States and its allies had
enacted substantially similar criminal codes aimed at prosecuting offenses of international char-
acter .... Id. Second, the witness must show that "the United States was granting immunity
from domestic prosecution for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be delivered to other na-
tions as prosecutors of a crime common to both countries .... Id.
376. International crime has dramatically increased largely due to technological advance-
ments, particularly with the advent of the Internet. See Amann, supra note 55, at 1261. In
addition, there are greater concerns about traditional transnational crime such as smuggling and
money laundering. Id. Because of greater opportunity for international crime, greater incen-
tives exist for the international community to cooperate in law enforcement. In fact, as one
scholar noted, there is "an unprecedented effort at cooperation among members of the world's
law enforcement community." Id.
377. Scholarship anticipates that traditional state values and greater considerations for human
values will continue evolving. Louis HENKEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLmCS AND VALUES 284
(1995). As Louis Henken commented, "[t]he need is to promote in every state a culture of
respect for individual freedom, autonomy and other human rights, and to overcome cultural
resistances .... One can state with substantial confidence that systemic attention to human
values will continue to increase." Id.
378. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972); Araneta,
794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969).
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called for an interpretation of foreign laws and the likelihood that a
government would utilize those laws against the particular witness
from whom testimony was sought. In most cases, the lower courts did
not reach the constitutional question because the fear of most wit-
nesses was too remote. 379 Now, however, because there is a prohibi-
tion against raising a defense based on fear of foreign prosecution, any
evaluation of laws of foreign countries is unnecessary. Even if the
witness faces a real and substantial fear, there is no constitutional pro-
tection against the government compelling testimony.
Before Balsys, the burden a witness bore to prove a real and sub-
stantial danger of foreign prosecution was heavy, as evidenced by the
number of witnesses who were denied the privilege because the dan-
ger of foreign prosecution was too remote. Even if the Balsys Court
had arrived at the opposite conclusion, the witnesses would be re-
quired to maintain the same burden. Arguably, with the internation-
alization of criminal prosecutions, the burden might have been
reduced. On the other hand, with the growing emphasis on human
rights and the creation of laws consistent with a focus on the value of
the individual, there may come a day when an international privilege
against self-incrimination is recognized.
Until then, individuals facing compulsion from the government will
be subjected to the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or con-
tempt," against which Justice Goldberg in Murphy warned. 380 The
witness will be required to testify truthfully, but this could serve as a
basis for deportation to a country that could use the testimony to
prosecute him under its laws. Alternatively, the witness might choose
to perjure himself. He could also refuse to testify, but the court would
respond by imposing a contempt order, either in the form of money
sanctions or prison. This final option is undesirable on two levels.
First, if Balsys were to continue on a course of noncompliance with
subpoena orders, opting for orders of contempt instead, the govern-
ment will not come any closer to forcing him to leave the United
States. Second, the cost of imprisonment will be borne by taxpayers,
who are not likely to support a policy that keeps "undesirable" resi-
dents in the United States at their expense.
379. See, e.g., In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d 1191 (11th Cir. 1985);
In re Nigro, 705 F.2d 1224 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Brummitt, 665 F.2d 521 (5th Cir.
1981); United States v. Yanagita, 552 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1977).
380. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
1038 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:987
C. The Impact on Alleged Nazi War Criminals
How this case will ultimately affect Balsys and other alleged Nazi
war collaborators is uncertain. Recent reports indicate that Lithuania
is casting a "blind eye" on Nazi war atrocities. 381 Since 1992, the
United States has revoked citizenship status to at least six elderly
Lithuanians accused of serious crimes during World War 11.382 All re-
turned to Lithuania, and none have been prosecuted, 383 despite Lith-
uania's promise to prosecute such criminals "'consistently and
conscientiously.' '"384 In fact, these suspects have been living quiet
lives, some being allowed to die peacefully of old age.385 In addition,
Lithuania has failed to extradite other accused criminals that the
United States has had trouble deporting.386 Presumably, one of these
alleged criminals is Balsys. The finding that Balsys faces a real and
substantial possibility of prosecution, therefore, is questionable.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, allowing Nazi war criminals to take refuge in the United
States is not in this country's best interest. But neither is the rule set
forth in Balsys. Balsys will allow the government to overreach its au-
thority and work on behalf of foreign nations who seek prosecution of
individuals residing in the United States. Although the Introduction
to this Note framed the issue in terms of the specific facts of Balsys,
which arguably made it difficult for the Supreme Court justices to re-
main objective, the outcome will not only affect cases in which the
381. See Richard C. Paddock, Lithuania's Blind Eye to Nazi Past, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1998, at
Al. It is interesting to note that enthusiasm for prosecuting alleged World War II criminals has
been losing steam worldwide, as certain countries have withdrawn resources from prosecuting
them. As the Washington Times reported in 1997, Israel has only tried two Nazi era criminals
since World War II, one of whom was hanged, Adolf Eichmann, the other who was freed after
being sentenced to death, Ivan Demjanjuk. Frank J. Murray, Fifth Amendment Protection Ex-
tends Only to the U.S. Border, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1997, at A4, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Wtime File. Lithuania has tried no one since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Id. The Canadian Federal Court recently refused to denaturalize an alleged Nazi collaborator, a
finding that is said to "seriously endanger ... [the] remaining denaturalization cases that date
back to the same period." Kirk Makin, Federal Court Throws Out Case Against Nazi Suspect,
GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 22, 1998, at A4, available in 1998 WL 21754050. A 1995 article, reviewing
two books about prosecutions of Nazi war criminals, noted that the "British and the Australians
... have concluded that the cost of searching for witnesses and documentation as evidence
against suspected war criminals is prohibitive. They excused themselves from further action ar-
guing that today ... it is already too late to seek justice." Alexander Zvielli, A Race Against
Time, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 6, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7550107.
382. Murray, supra note 381, at A4.
383. Id.
384. Id. (quoting Lithuanian leaders).
385. Id.
386. Id.
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witness is a suspected Nazi war collaborator. Rather, the cases in
which a witness claims fear of foreign prosecution could be limitless.
This Supreme Court holding should not end the discussion about the
scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Instead, it should serve as a means to thoroughly analyze the purposes
of the privilege.
Sara A. Leahy
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